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Abstract
An individual experiences double coverage when he bene￿ts from more than
one health insurance plan at the same time. This paper examines the impact of
such supplementary insurance on the utilisation of health care. Its novelty is that
within the context of count data modelling and without imposing restrictive para-
metric assumptions, the analysis is carried out for di⁄erent points of the conditional
distribution, not only for its mean location.
We use data for Portugal on the consumption of doctor visits, taking advantage
of particular features of the public and private protection schemes on top of the
statutory National Health Service. Results indicate that double coverage generates
additional utilisation of health care and, even though it is present in the whole
outcome distribution, by looking at di⁄erent points we unveil that the e⁄ects are
relatively smaller for more frequent users. Another interesting ￿nding regards the
source of supplementary insurance since although both public and private second
layers of health care protection increase the utilisation of doctor visits, it adds more
to the consumption when provided by private organizations.
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The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of double health insurance coverage (i.e.
a situation in which an individual is covered by more than one health insurance plan)1
on the utilisation of health care. It is well known that if the demand for health care
reacts to changes to budget constraints and preferences, thus better or more extensive
insurance should also have important e⁄ects because it a⁄ects price of services, income
of the insured and opportunity cost of time in case of illnesses. The impact of double
coverage is often associated to an aggravation of moral hazard that creates incentives for
people to go to the doctor more frequently and eventually because of less severe illness.2
Organizational designs of health care systems may generate layers of coverage. The
most common situation regards the case of the individual who bene￿ts from compulsory
public insurance and nevertheless decides to additionally purchase a private one. Such
supplementary private health insurance usually overlaps the range of health care services
provided by the statutory health system. With additional layers of coverage, people can
increase the set of available providers, have a faster access and reduce out-of-pocket prices.
Quantitatively, double coverage is not a negligible phenomenon. It can be found in all
European countries. Furthermore, in the United States, the health reform is expected
to increase health coverage, inclusively by allowing Americans to maintain their current
insurance scheme while accessing new options. In such scenario, double coverage situations
are expected to augment signi￿cantly in coming years. Research on this phenomenon can
help to detect whether possible ine¢ ciencies and inequalities, causing unnecessary and
costly utilization, should be a concern.
Existing works addressing health insurance focus on mean e⁄ects. In contrast, by
looking at other points of the conditional distribution we unveil if the stronger e⁄ects are
found among more or less frequent users. Our ￿ndings are the result of the application of
an innovative technique for estimating the quantile regression for counts. The estimates
1The terms "duplicate coverage", "supplementary health insurance" or "additional health insurance"
are used alternatively in the literature.
2Moral hazard in this context is de￿ned as the "change in health behaviour and health care consump-
tion caused by insurance" (Zweifel and Manning 2000). Some authors criticize the direct association of
double coverage with moral hazard, arguing on the existence of other important e⁄ects. For instance,
Vera-HernÆndez (1999) refers the impact of insurance on individual￿health, which will decrease the future
consumption of health care. Also Coulson et al. (1995) points to the importance of supply-inducement
by providers.
1were computed with Portuguese data, using as source of double coverage the existing
health insurance schemes beyond the National Health Service (NHS). Approximately a
quarter of the Portuguese population has access to a second layer of health insurance
coverage on top of the NHS, through mandatory occupation-based health schemes (usually
referred to as health subsystems because of the Portuguese subsistemas) and voluntary
private insurance. We focus our attention on the double coverage resulting from the former
type, regarding both health insurance plans provided to public employees and insurance
plans of special private companies/sectors. Results indicate positive e⁄ects of subsystems
coverage on the utilisation of health care (especially large for private subsystems). An
interesting ￿nding, which could only be observed through the use of quantile analysis, is
that these e⁄ects are relatively more relevant for the ￿rst levels of usage since for more
frequent users, consumption behaviour seems to depend slightly less on the additional
layer of insurance.
We measure health care utilisation through the traditional indicator ￿number of visits
to a doctor ￿a non-negative integer count characterized by large proportion of zeros and
positive skewness. Until recently the one-part and two-part models have dominated the
empirical literature (Deb and Trivedi 2002). One-part models explain health care utili-
sation with a single equation as a function of a set of medical care determinants, usually
within the Poisson and negative binomial frameworks. The second approach estimates
two equations, one to distinguish between users and non-users and a second to explain the
intensity of usage. In this framework the Hurdle models are the most extensively used.
The appeal of two-part models comes from the fact that it is both well supported empir-
ically (partly driven by the high incidence of zero usage), and also well connected to a
principal-agent model (the individual decides whether to visit the doctor and once the ini-
tial contact is made, the doctor in￿ uences the decision about the level of usage, especially
the referrals). More recent literature relies on a ￿nite mixture variant of the latent class
model, where individuals are usually distinguished between frequent and non-frequent
users instead of the distinction users/non-users of the two part models. Proponents of
these latter models argue that the distinction between frequent/non-frequent is better de-
termined by health status, attitudes towards risk and life-style choices (Deb and Trivedi
2002). The two-part literature argues against this view stating that latent class frame-
works are mainly driven by statistical reasoning and are not suitable for cross-sectional
2data (JimØnez-Mart￿n et al. 2002). Estimators resulting from any of these econometric
tools rely on assumptions about the functional form of the regression equation and the
distribution of the error term. As a result, standard models determine entirely the distrib-
utional behaviour once the conditional mean response is known. An attractive alternative
is the usage of nonparametric and semiparametric estimators. Introduced for continuous
data in Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile regression o⁄ers a complete picture of the
e⁄ect of the covariates on the location, scale and shape of the distribution of the depen-
dent variable. As a semiparametric method it assumes a parametric speci￿cation for the
quantile of the conditional distribution but leaves the error term unspeci￿ed. It was ￿rst
applied to continuous health data in Manning et al. (1995). As in Winkelmann (2006)
and Liu (2007), we apply the approach suggested by Machado and Santos-Silva (2005)
in which quantile regression is extended to count data through a "jittering" process that
arti￿cially imposes some degree of smoothness. This technique allows an important step
forward to understand the utilisation behaviour of medical care, enabling, for example,
the assessment of the e¢ ciency and equity of a particular system and whether a health
reform has a di⁄erent e⁄ect among low and high users. This kind of econometric tool
can also be used to analyse the need for adjustments on contracts provided by insurance
companies.
Many authors have investigated the impact of supplementary health care protection
derived from insurance plans with di⁄erent levels of coverage (for example Cameron et al.
1988, Coulson et al. 1995, Vera-HernÆndez 1999, Louren￿o 2007 and Barros et al. 2008).
The usage of non-experimental data generally creates an endogeneity problem related to
adverse selection since most of the times the decision to buy extra health care coverage is
an individual choice that is likely to be in￿ uenced by its health status and attitudes to-
wards risk. In such cases, the insurance parameter does not disentangle moral hazard and
adverse selection e⁄ects (also called insurance and selection e⁄ect). The solution relies
most of the times on ￿nding reasonable instrumental variables. Our empirical applica-
tion does not have this problem because the membership on public and private health
subsystems was mandatory and based on professional category, and as such unrelated to
the expected value of future health care consumption (unless we consider issues related
with occupational choice). Moreover, contributions are based on income and not on risk
characteristics of each individual.
3Data was taken from the Portuguese Health Survey of 2005/2006, a cross sectional
health dataset that provides a wide range of information at an individual level concerning
socioeconomic conditions and health status indicators. After excluding individuals with
private voluntary health insurance, observations were divided according to the type of
health insurance. We chose three mutually exclusive groups according to their health
care coverage: only the NHS, the NHS plus a public subsystem or the NHS plus a private
subsystem. Despite having some common features, both public and private groups include
several subsystems. To explain the number of doctor consultations besides the health
insurance status variable we also control for health status, demographic and socioeconomic
condition, seasonal and geographic e⁄ects. The variables were selected from questions
included in the survey. The selection took into account the Grossman￿ s health capital
model (Grossman 1972) as well as the main factors in￿ uencing medical care consumption
identi￿ed in the literature. When using data for Portugal we contribute to the literature
on the impact oh health subsystems on the utilisation of health care. The motivation in
studying the impact arising of public and private subsystems in the Portuguese health
sector is partially related to e¢ ciency and equity concerns. It would have been expected
that the creation of a public health system in 1979, prompted the integration of public
employees￿plans into the NHS, which in fact did not happen. The non-integration of
these subsystems raised some equity issues as the NHS provides a less comprehensive
health protection plan than those available under public and private health schemes, which
ensure a higher level of access to health care services at lower costs. When compared to
previous research, our work is more comprehensive covering all the subsystems, while
former contributions (e.g. Barros et al. 2008 and Louren￿o 2007) focused on the e⁄ect of
the most important public health scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes some features of the Por-
tuguese health care system. Section 3 describes the dataset and the relevant variables,
and presents an exploratory analysis of the data. In Section 4 we introduce the quantile
regression for counts as well as other models such as the one-part and two-part parametric
count data models, which will be used as a benchmark. In the methodological part we
present the techniques and discuss the empirical speci￿cation. In Section 5 we analyse the
results from the quantile regression framework, along with the results from the benchmark
parametric models. Section 6 presents the ￿nal remarks.
42 Overview of the Portuguese health care system
The Portuguese health system is a network of public and private health care providers
and di⁄erent funding schemes.3 It is possible to identify three overlapping layers: the
National Health Service (NHS)4, special public and private employer-provided schemes
(subsystems) and private voluntary health insurance. While the NHS is mainly ￿nanced
by general taxation, subsystems resources come from employees and employers compulsory
contributions (including, in the public schemes, State funds to ensure their balance).
According to Barros and Simıes (2007), in 2004 public funding represented 71.2 per cent
of total health expenditure (of which 57.6 per cent is related with the NHS and 7.0
per cent cent with subsidies to public subsystems). Private expenditure is composed by
co-payments and direct payments made by patients and, to a lesser extent, by private
insurance premiums.
The complexity of the Portuguese health care system has some historical foundations.
In 1979, with the creation of the NHS, legislation established that all residents have the
right to health protection regardless of economic or social status. Until then, the State
only had full responsibility for the health care of public employees. For the remaining
population, the State provided limited preventive care and speci￿c health services (such as
maternity, child and mental care), and had some interventions in the control of infectious
diseases. After the outset of the statutory public system, the health subsystems wer not
integrated into the NHS and continued to cover public employes. Barros and Simıes
(2007) state that these schemes were kept because trade unions, which ran and managed
some of the funds, were not willing to give up their privileges and forcefully defended
their maintenance on behalf of their members. The existence of some private subsystems
is also in￿ uenced by this reality because they cover employees of large companies that
in the past were nationalized (in the sequence of the mid-70s revolution) and have been
later privatized.
Individuals covered solely by the NHS (the majority of the population) face some
3This section is mostly based on Barros and Simıes (2007) and Louren￿o (2007). An interesting
comparison between the Portuguese health system and other European systems is available in Bago-
d￿ Uva and Jones (2009).
4In the autonomous regions, public health is ensured by regional health services (RHS of Azores and
Madeira) following the same principles of the NHS but implemented by regional governments. Here it is
not useful to treat them separately.
5constraints in the access to public providers, in particular because of services excluded
from the public network and di¢ culties of access due to time costs (long waiting lists
and queuing) and geographical barriers. Louren￿o (2007) among others, argues that the
NHS coverage restrictions convert its normative completeness into an incomplete health
insurance contract. In the access to medical consultations, the NHS is designed in a way
that bene￿ciaries should ￿rst seek health care through their family doctor (general prac-
titioner) in health care centres and then, if necessary, get appropriate referrals to a public
specialist consultation (generally as out-patient consultations in public hospitals). This
gatekeeper procedure is not strictly followed since there are households who do not have
access to a family doctor and, even when they have, the time lag between the ￿rst step
to obtain health care and its actual provision is frequently too long. Additionally, the
requirements to obtain referrals are generally very demanding. For these reasons, some
individuals have their ￿rst contact with medical care in hospitals￿emergency rooms even
if their condition would not require it. The NHS design contemplates a cost-share mecha-
nism that in practice makes some patients (a large share of the population is exempt) pay
a mandatory small co-payment to the public provider, usually on a fee-for-service basis.
Given the constraints of the public network, the consumption of private services by NHS
bene￿ciaries5 is very common and, in the absence of private voluntary insurance schemes,
they bear the full cost of such services, without being reimbursed afterwards.
A considerable share of the population (between 20-25 per cent) bene￿ts fromemployer-
provided health insurance through several subsystems, either private or public. Occupation-
based schemes cover all employees both in working age and retirement, as well as spouses
and descendants. Among those health protection plans, the largest public subsystem is
a Government department (ADSE) acting as a health insurance provider for public em-
ployees, covering about 15 per cent of the population. Several speci￿c schemes also exist,
for example, for armed forces personnel. As to private subsystems, they are mainly set
up by unions and cover employees of the historic telecommunications operator and postal
services, as well as banking and associated insurance employees.
Each subsystem has a distinct array of medical care insurance arrangements to ￿-
nance and provide health care. As a whole, we can say that they are organized di⁄erently
5In the course of the paper, when it says "NHS bene￿ciaries", we consider individuals covered solely
by NHS. Therefore, this de￿nition excludes the population with double coverage.
6from the NHS, in particular because of the lower proportion of services directly provided.
They basically make health care available through contracts with public/NHS and pri-
vate institutions and reimburse patients costs for services supplied by private entities
without contract. These features make these schemes more comprehensive health pro-
tection plans than NHS, representing both complementary and supplementary types of
insurance (Louren￿o 2007). People bene￿ting from additional health care schemes, ei-
ther mandatory or voluntary, are not a⁄ected in their taxation and remain eligible to
receive health care from the NHS. In this context, subsystems have been gradually po-
sitioned as mainly complementary to the statutory system. In fact, the main impact of
bene￿ting from double coverage is having "less expensive" access to medical specialities
(in particular, by reimbursing part os patients cost in all private providers, even those
without contracts) that in practice makes the subsystems bene￿ciaries more heavy users
of such type of consultations, vis-￿-vis the general practitioner (GP) consultations pat-
tern among NHS bene￿ciaries (Comissªo para a Sustentabilidade do Financiamento do
Servi￿o Nacional de Saœde 2006). Because of the double coverage and di⁄erent State
funding among subgroups of the population, the existence of these subsystems is often
pointed as a factor of inequity within the Portuguese health care system (van Doorslaer
and Jones 2004). Table A1 of Appendix A allows for a systematic comparison between
the Portuguese non-voluntary health insurance schemes.
3 Data
3.1 Dataset
Data was taken from the fourth Portuguese Health Survey (PHS), a cross sectional health
dataset designed to be representative of the Portuguese household population.6 It provides
a wide range of information at an individual level, namely demographic and socioeconomic
conditions, type of health insurance, health-care utilisation, health status indicators (such
as chronic diseases and long/short run disability), lifestyles (such as eating habits and
6PHS is carried out by the Portuguese Ministry of Health in collaboration with the National Health
Institute Ricardo Jorge and the National Statistical Institute. Until now, four questionnaires have been
made (1987, 1995/1996, 1998/1999 and 2005/2006) using representative probabilistic samples of the
continental population (1st, 2nd and 3th PHS) and of both continental and autonomous regions of
Azores and Madeira population (4th PHS). Here we made use of the last available questionnaire. Note
that it is not a panel survey because the sample changes between surveys.
7sports activity) and expenditure levels. The PHS sample re￿ ects the geographical struc-
ture of the population according to the 2001 census, resulting from a two-stage cluster
sampling that followed a complex design involving both strati￿cation and systematic se-
lection of clusters. The survey was collected by interviews carried out between February
2005 and January 2006, being selected a total of 19,950 households units and in each
household all individuals were face-to-face interviewed.
The sample used in this paper comprises 35,308 observations and was obtained after
de￿ning the population of interest and handling the data. Firstly, we restrict our pop-
ulation to individuals without voluntary private health insurance and with less than 80
years old.7 Secondly, we excluded 40 observations of individuals that did not report the
number of visits to a doctor and 8 observations without answer regarding the subsystem
they belong to. Finally, we deleted further 1,047 observations with missing values for any
other relevant variables (according to the set of regressors chosen).
Two points should be made about the latter choices. Firstly, the exclusion of voluntary
health insurance individuals can be pointed as a shortcoming. However, the inclusion of
such variable could introduce endogeneity problems, which would be di¢ cult to eliminate
since there are no suitable instrumental variables (Barros et al. 2008). In this context and
given the relatively small number of insured individuals (less than 8 per cent) it seems
better to exclude such observations with a cost of restrict the analysis to the population
exclusively insured through mandatory schemes. Regarding the exclusion of observations
of persons with more than 80 years, the decision was related to the measurement of
treatments e⁄ects, as explained in due course.
Secondly, the simplest way of handling missing data is to delete them and analyze
only the sample of "complete observations" (although deleting observations reduces the
e¢ ciency of the estimation). The usage of a listwise deletion procedure is statistically
appropriate only if the missing values are "missing completely at random" (Cameron
and Trivedi 2005), which means that the probability of missing does not depend of its
own value nor on the values of other variables in the dataset (the observed sample is a
random subsample of the potential full sample). In our case listwise deletion is clearly
acceptable because incomplete observations comprise a small percentage (less than 3 per
7We also excluded 145 observations of pregnant women whose visits to the doctor were related to their
condition.
8cent) of total observations. Moreover, among the relevant questions of our dataset that
can create a sample selection problem, the one that generated more missing observations
concerns the income level. However, most of the missing (around seventy per cent) does
not result from a non answer but from individuals that declare not knowing the household
income, which if not deliberately makes unlikely that unobserved factors in￿ uenced both
the decision to respond and the value of the dependent variable.
Finally, another important feature that is worth noting is that the sample was distrib-
uted in order to ensure an adequate geographical distribution, and as a consequence the
survey has a weight variable. If we ignore the weights we may obtain biased parameter
estimates, certainly in designs where some categories have been oversampled (Wooldridge
2002, Cameron and Trivedi 2005). It is possible to ignore weights without a⁄ecting the
parameter estimates, in particular when sampling weights are solely a function of in-
dependent variables, or when the model can be respeci￿ed (including new variables or
interactions). This is more likely in the case where the weights are almost uncorrelated
with the dependent variable, which occurs in our analysis. Additionally, the variables un-
der the sample design of PHS are included as covariates in our estimation. The problem
with the use of a weighted dataset is that it leads to arti￿cially small standard errors for
regression coe¢ cients and therefore incorrect inferences on the signi￿cance of the di⁄erent
e⁄ects.8
3.2 The variables
To capture health care utilisation we use the total number of visits to doctors in the
three months prior to the interview. The question in the survey was: "How many times
did you visit a physician in the last three months?". The survey design conditioned the
measure because it is overly aggregated, encompassing consultations to GPs and specialist
8The standard errors will usually be too small because there is no i.i.d. property (the independence
assumption no longer holds). If one wants to take weighting into account and derives appropriate standard
errors for the coe¢ cients, we could include the strati￿cation variable(s) in the regression as interaction
terms with independent variables or in loglinear models as an o⁄set variable. The problem arises when
the interactions of the stratifying variable(s) with the independent variables are all signi￿cant. In this
case it will not be a practical method as it will lead to a large number of e⁄ects, many of which may not be
substantively interesting. An alternative is to derive corrected standard errors using software designed for
complex survey designs in which cases with large weight values are treated as a replication of several cases
and have a corresponding impact on the standard deviation, even though they are measured with the
same accuracy as cases with small weight values. The weighted dataset should determine the estimates,
but the unweighted dataset should determine the standard errors. For more details, see Cameron and
Trivedi (2005) chapter 24.
9doctors, as well as emergency episodes.9 Another missing piece of information regarding
the consultations is related to the nature of its provider, particularly whether it is public or
private. Nevertheless, the number of doctor visits is certainly the best available indicator
and any adjustment to that measure designed to capture the real amount of resources
used would certainly be based on very strong assumptions.
Table I presents the covariates used in our analysis clustered into groups encompassing
health insurance status, socioeconomic characteristics and health status. In addition, two
further groups were also included to control for geographic and seasonal e⁄ects. We
selected the variables among the raw data available in the database10 according to their
in￿ uence on medical care utilisation, taking into account the Grossman￿ s health capital
model of demand for health (1972) as well as the results of similar empirical studies
(Cameron et al. 1988, Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995, Vera-HernÆndez 1999, Deb and Trivedi
2002, Winkelmann 2004 and Louren￿o 2007). It is not straightforward to understand the
utilisation of health care since it is a result of both patients and doctors decisions, as
well as of both demand and supply sides. It is possible, however, to ￿nd several channels
through which the selected variables a⁄ect the number of doctor visits (even though it is
not our goal to disentangle them). For instance, according to microeconomic theory, the
main factors in￿ uencing the estimation of a demand curve should be the budget constraint
and individual preferences, which are potentially captured through some PHS questions.
The health insurance status is often pointed as a very important factor of health care
utilisation. We account for three possible insurance situations, that made us consider
three mutually exclusive groups of observations: namely the "NHS" composed by indi-
viduals with only the statutory health system and two double coverage types, the "Public
subsystems" for people with NHS plus a public subsystem and the "Private subsystems"
for individuals with NHS and a private subsystem. These variables are of particular im-
portance since the main goal of this work is to assess how a patient·s use of medical
consultations is a⁄ected by double coverage. Insurance has an important link with the
price of going to a doctor: the di⁄erences between health care protection plans as regards
to costs to bene￿ciaries (such as co-payments and reimbursements practices) work as di-
9The survey includes a question about the type of doctor (GP or specialist) of the last visit but it
does not allow to disentangle all the visits taken in the period of three months.
10Some information was excluded from the analysis, particularly the questions reported only by part
of the sample according to the week of the interview.
10rect prices and both mechanisms to control for its use and delivery systems are indirect
costs of access. Since insurance in￿ uences the price faced by patients, it in￿ uences the
budget constraint (together with income). In fact, when compared to the NHS, the sub-
systems provide more bene￿ts to their bene￿ciaries by decreasing the price-per-service
faced by patients, which whenever demand is elastic, increases their health care demand
(Barros et al. 2008). See Section 4.3 for more details regarding the interpretation of the
impact of these dummy variables.
The underlying health status and the socioeconomic characteristics play a major role
in the preferences￿formation. Health status also in￿ uences the constraints limiting the
pursuit of preferences since illness events usually imply a loss of income (although some-
times partially o⁄set by sickness bene￿ts). It can be questionable whether the health
status regressors do not introduce a problem of endogeneity. The idea is that individuals
usually become aware of their health status through medical consultations. We believe
that this is not a problem, especially if one takes into account that the dependent variable
is number of visits to doctors in the three months prior to the interview and individuals
are likely to be conscious about their diseases for longer time. In the PHS, health status is
only indirectly captured through some questions that re￿ ect details about current medical
conditions (e.g. sickness episodes and limited days) and the presence of chronic disease
or pain (e.g. rheumatism, cancer and diabetes). Besides including such variables, the
consumption of barbiturates as a proxy to the level of exposure to stress, as well as some
other regressors related to attitudes with a potential impact on health, like the number of
meals and a dummy variable identifying smokers/non-smokers, also play a role. Despite
being crude measures, these last regressors may capture some remaining health aspects
and some unobserved in￿ uences. Engagement in sports activities is an alternative proxy
for good health but was only available for a small part of the sample, which would imply
a substantial decrease in the size of the sample. Winkelmann (2004) and Winkelmann
(2006) also include individual subjective self-assessment of health status. PHS provides
that information (with the question "How well do you perceive your own health at the
present time?", with responses "very good", "good", "fair", "poor" and "very poor") but
we excluded its use. These variables are likely to create an endogeneity problem: the self-
understanding of the health status in￿ uences the utilisation of medical care but it is also
in￿ uenced by utilisation since the assessment is made after visiting the doctor. Moreover,
11the non-response is extremely high (around 30 per cent). As suggested by Windweijer and
Santos-Silva (1997), we partially control for this subjective health evaluation by including
long-term determinants of health (smoking and eating habits).
Table I: Description of the variables
Variables Description
Health insurance status variables
pubsub =1 if the individual is covered by a public subsystem
privsub =1 if the individual is covered by a private subsystem
Health status variables
sick =1 if the individual is being sick
limitdays number of days with temporary (not long run) incapacity
limited =1 if the individual is limited/handicapped
rheumatism =1 if the individual has rheumatism
osteoporosis =1 if the individual has osteoporosis
cancer =1 if the individual has cancer
kidneystones =1 if the individual has kidneystones
renalfailure =1 if the individual has renalfailure
emphysema =1 if the individual has emphysema
cerebralhemorrhage =1 if the individual had a cerebral hemorrhage
infarction =1 if the individual had an infarction
depressivedisorder =1 if the individual has a depressive disorder
otherchronicaldisease =1 if the individual has another chronical disease
highbloodpressure =1 if the individual has high blood pressure
chronicpain =1 if the individual has a chronic pain
diabetes =1 if the individual has diabetes
asthma =1 if the individual has asthma
stress
=1 if the individual has been taking sleeping pills
or anxiety pills in the last two weeks
smoker =1 if the individual smokes daily
meals =1 if the individual makes at least three meals a day
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize household size of the individual
age age in years
female =1 if the individual is female
educmax
number of years of schooling completed with success
of the most educated person living in the household
lincome logarithm of equivalent monthly income (in euros)
single =1 if the individual is single and do not cohabits
student
=1 if the individual is student or has it ￿st job
or has a not remunerated job
retired =1 if the individual is retired
Geographic variables
Norte =1 if the individual lives in the region "Norte" (NUTS II)
Lisboa =1 if the individual lives in the region "Lisboa" (NUTS II)
Alentejo =1 if the individual lives in the region "Alentejo" (NUTS II)
Algarve =1 if the individual lives in the region "Algarve" (NUTS II)
A￿ores =1 if the individual lives in the region "A￿ores" (NUTS II)
Madeira =1 if the individual lives in the region "Madeira" (NUTS II)
Seasonal variables
winter =1 if the interview took place in the winter
spring =1 if the interview took place in the spring
summer =1 if the interview took place in the summer
12The variables representing demographic and socioeconomic features of the interviewed
can in￿ uence the decision to seek health care directly and indirectly through their impact
on health care status. This is particularly evident when analysing the covariate "age".
According to Grossman (1972), age captures the depreciation of health capital which
in￿ uences the health status and is an important factor in￿ uencing individual preferences.
It is expected that the rate of depreciation increases as the individual gets older, at least
after some point of the life cycle, making the healthy times decrease. As a consequence, the
demand for health care is expected to increase over the life cycle. At the same time, age
is an extra variable that can be considered as a health status proxy since older individuals
are, on average, less healthy and less e¢ cient in producing health. We chose to control for
age through a nonlinear relationship and by including variables that allow an assessment
of its e⁄ect by gender type.
Amongst the socioeconomic covariates, a gender dummy was included because it is
believed to in￿ uence the rate at which the health stock depreciates and the e¢ ciency in
producing healthy times. In particular, it is expected that health depends on biological
di⁄erences between men and women through innate features, life styles and di⁄erent
attitudes towards health risk (Louren￿o 2007). Accordingly, we also control for the marital
status with the inclusion of the covariate "single". Besides the arguments of di⁄erent life
styles and attitudes toward risk, it is our understanding that some decisions when taken by
more than one person bene￿t from advice and more information, which should in￿ uence
health status and e¢ ciency in producing healthy times.11
To control for education, we de￿ned a variable with the number of schooling years of
the most educated person living in the household (in line with the procedure in Louren￿o
(2007)). It is expected that more educated people are more productive in the market as
well as in the household, therefore even if they seek for more health they need relatively
less medical care (Jones et al. 2006). Further, di⁄erent educational levels are associated
with di⁄erent opportunity costs and attitudes towards risk. This particular indicator
was chosen, as an alternative to the usual number of schooling years of each individual,
because we believe that the decision about the number of visits to a doctor is at least
partially a decision of the household and bene￿ting from a better level of information.
11Most of the studies include a slightly di⁄erent variable that assumes one if the person is married
instead of single. The design of the survey and some previous results in￿ uenced the choice of this
particular variable.
13The variables "student" and "retired" capture occupational status which may explain
some di⁄erences in the depreciation rate. It is expected that a person who does not work,
presents lower opportunity costs of visiting a doctor, than an individual with a regular
job (Louren￿o 2007). Further, since hours of market and non-market can have di⁄erent
values and the stock of health determines the total amount of time to spend producing
earnings and commodities, more active individuals should invest more in health capital
(Grossman 1972).
Another variable included in the model is the monthly equivalent income. According
to Grossman (1972) there are reasons to believe that medical utilisation increases with
income: "The higher a person￿ s wage rate, the greater the value to him of an increase in
healthy time". The idea is that the cost of being ill is higher. A converse argument is
that the opportunity cost of going to the doctor is higher for higher wages (Jones et al.
2006). In addition to this, income also represents the ability to pay, as a proxy of wealth.
In the PHS, income is only compiled for the household as a whole through a categorical
ordinal variable with ten thresholds that indicate intervals of net disposable household
income in the month prior to the interview (including wages, pensions, and all sorts of
social security bene￿ts). A common procedure to control for income e⁄ects is including
in the model a set of dummy variables, one for each category. Here, such alternative is
not very attractive due to the fact that it would be impossible to take into account the
composition of households. We chose a more ￿ exible and parsimonious modelling strategy
(although not problem-free) with the construction of a monthly income variable that, in a
￿rst stage assigns an income corresponding to the midpoint of the interval, and in a second
stage interpolates grouped data by taking into account di⁄erences in the composition of
households (in line with Pereira 1995). This procedure has the disadvantage of assuming
that the income of the household is the midpoint of its income class and, additionally, for
the open-ended category it was necessary to assume an arbitrarily value. We use e2500
but we test the robustness of this value by considering other ￿gures, in particular, the
estimate for the median of this last income bracket calculated using a Pareto distribution.
To take into account the composition of households we used the square root scale, through
dividing the household income by the square root of household size.12
12The "individual" income is measured with error given the way it is compiled in the survey and the
modelling procedure. Concerning the latter, we tested di⁄erent alternatives and we found only minor
di⁄erences in the estimates.
14The variables "Norte", "Lisboa", "Alentejo", "Algarve", "A￿ores" and "Madeira"
("Centro" being omitted)13 represent the region of residence and were included to control
for possible di⁄erences in the demand and supply of health care services. The regions
encompass wide areas but nevertheless, when we compare them in terms of wealth or ed-
ucational indicators we obtain huge di⁄erences, which could justi￿e di⁄erent behaviours
regarding the usage of health care services (not totally captured at the individual level).
Apart from this argument, the main reason to include these variables is because they
proxy di⁄erent access to medical care supply, since some regional services are di⁄erently
organized. Note that in the mainland, the ￿ve regions correspond to the ￿ve regional
health administrations, and in the autonomous regions there are two di⁄erent regional
health services.
To control for the period of the year in which the interview took place we included the
regressors "spring", "summer", and "winter" ("autumn" being omitted). This is impor-
tant because there may be some seasonal di⁄erences in the health status of individuals.
3.3 An exploratory analysis of the data
Table II presents the empirical distribution of the dependent variable (y) and some basic
statistics. As the table shows, the majority of observations are of the NHS group, followed
by the public subsystem. The dependent variable used is a count variable (non-negative
integer valued count y = 0;1;2;:::) with a large proportion of zeros (half of the sample) as
well as a long right tail of individuals who make heavy use of health care. These features
make the estimation particularly di¢ cult since it will be necessary to use ￿ exible models
that accommodate them. For the whole sample, the average number of consultations
is 1.01 and the average number of visits for those that have at least one visit is 2.04.
Moreover, the unconditional variance is more than three times the unconditional mean.14
When we analyse the average number of visits to a doctor by health insurance systems, it
is possible to observe that private subsystems bene￿ciaries are more frequent users than
the groups NHS and public subsystems. Indeed, a mean comparison t-test indicates that
the unconditional probability does not di⁄er across NHS and public subsystems but di⁄er
13In accordance with NUT II classi￿cation (o¢ cial territorial nomenclature for statistical analysis),
Portugal is divided into seven regions. The survey includes data for all of them. Therefore, we use six
dummies.
14This is a sign of possible overdispersion just con￿rmed when a conditional analysis is made.
15when one compares NHS with private subsystems.
Table II: Empirical distribution of the dependent variable
TOTAL NHS Public sub. Private sub.
y relative frequency
0 50.31 50.88 48.82 41.91
1 26.94 26.53 28.54 29.83
2 10.78 10.61 11.37 12.61
3 6.77 6.82 6.15 8.72
4 1.99 2.02 1.69 2.84
5 1.12 1.06 1.25 2.10
6 0.98 0.95 1.17 0.95
7 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.21
8 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.42
9 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.11
10 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.11
11-15 0.25 0.28 0.15 0.11
16-20 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.11
21-25 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00
26-30 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.00
Observations
35,308 28,778 5,578 952
100% 81.5% 15.8% 2.7%
Mean
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.19
Standard deviation
1.77 1.80 1.64 1.61
P-value (Ho: ￿YNHS = ￿YSubsystem)
- - 0.998 0.000
Table III presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables by health
insurance type. The mean comparison t-test indicates that most of the di⁄erences between
the three types are signi￿cant, which suggest that a more complete account for them is
required, so that an appropriate comparison of health care demand across groups can be
made.
The dissimilarities between NHS and public and private subsystems are specially high
among the socioeconomic pre-determined variables. The NHS group has relatively less
years of education and lower income. On its turn, public subsystems bene￿ciaries are
younger (on average about 4 years less than the other groups), have a greater proportion
of students and singles and a smaller share of retired persons. The private subsystems
group has less women and a smaller household size.
16Table III: Descriptive statistics by health insurance system
NHS Public subsystem Private subsystem
mean st.dev mean st.dev p-value mean st.dev p-value
Health status variables
sick 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.363
limitdays 0.613 0.015 0.488 0.030 0.000 0.536 0.077 0.327
limited 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.000
rheumatism 0.168 0.002 0.120 0.004 0.000 0.134 0.011 0.003
osteoporosis 0.069 0.001 0.060 0.003 0.014 0.068 0.008 0.943
cancer 0.019 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.688 0.022 0.005 0.491
kidneystones 0.048 0.001 0.051 0.003 0.473 0.058 0.008 0.224
renalfailure 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.196 0.014 0.004 0.971
emphysema 0.034 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.005 0.015
cerebralhemorrhage 0.018 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.020 0.005 0.654
infarction 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.103 0.014 0.004 0.956
depressivedisorder 0.074 0.002 0.074 0.004 0.934 0.082 0.009 0.395
otherchronicaldisease 0.319 0.003 0.297 0.006 0.001 0.317 0.015 0.928
highbloodpressure 0.221 0.002 0.178 0.005 0.000 0.222 0.013 0.977
chronicpain 0.148 0.002 0.110 0.004 0.000 0.119 0.010 0.006
diabetes 0.077 0.002 0.054 0.003 0.000 0.074 0.008 0.651
asthma 0.051 0.001 0.057 0.003 0.075 0.049 0.007 0.837
stress 0.119 0.002 0.104 0.004 0.001 0.124 0.011 0.631
smoker 0.162 0.002 0.138 0.005 0.000 0.179 0.012 0.200
meals 0.926 0.002 0.949 0.003 0.000 0.933 0.008 0.402
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize 3.387 0.009 3.342 0.017 0.020 3.100 0.037 0.000
age 42.044 0.131 38.984 0.285 0.000 42.946 0.685 0.196
female 0.515 0.003 0.537 0.007 0.003 0.419 0.016 0.000
educmax 8.112 0.026 11.949 0.061 0.000 11.625 0.147 0.000
lincome 6.048 0.003 6.624 0.007 0.000 6.669 0.019 0.000
single 0.350 0.003 0.391 0.007 0.000 0.322 0.015 0.076
student 0.164 0.002 0.247 0.006 0.000 0.188 0.013 0.065
retired 0.185 0.002 0.171 0.005 0.012 0.256 0.014 0.000
Geographic variables
Norte 0.161 0.002 0.093 0.004 0.000 0.104 0.010 0.000
Lisboa 0.126 0.002 0.146 0.005 0.000 0.232 0.014 0.000
Alentejo 0.136 0.002 0.166 0.005 0.000 0.120 0.011 0.133
Algarve 0.146 0.002 0.122 0.004 0.000 0.181 0.012 0.006
A￿ores 0.147 0.002 0.205 0.005 0.000 0.169 0.012 0.079
Madeira 0.139 0.002 0.147 0.005 0.127 0.060 0.008 0.000
Seasonality variables
winter 0.255 0.003 0.254 0.006 0.873 0.314 0.015 0.000
Spring 0.258 0.003 0.255 0.006 0.702 0.235 0.014 0.110
Summer 0.249 0.003 0.237 0.006 0.052 0.246 0.014 0.825
Notes: The p-value indicates if the probability of the mean of each variable does not signi￿-
cantly di⁄er across insurance types. The test is performed as a two-sample mean-comparison test
(unpaired). For the comparison between the NHS and the public subsystem we considered H0:
￿YNHS = ￿YPublic subsystem; and for the comparison between the NHS and the private subsystem
we considered H0: ￿YNHS = ￿YPr ivate subsystem.
As regards the health status distributions of the three groups, it is possible to conclude
that the major di⁄erences are found between the public subsystem and the NHS. Public
employees seem to be the healthier, in particular when we analyse some variables related
17to physical limitations ("limited days" and "limited") and the presence of chronic diseases
and pains. Moreover, frequent health problems (e.g. high blood pressure, diabetes and
stress) are relatively more common in the NHS and private subsystem groups. This feature
can be partially related with age, which is lower among the public subsystems group.
Additionally, it is worth highlighting that public employees seem to be less exposed to
stress and that the indicators related to attitudes show a smaller proportion of smokers and
a higher average number of meals. The regional distribution of the groups is also unequal
in the full sample: most of the NHS individuals are located in the North; the public
employees are concentrated in Lisbon, Alentejo and Azores; and the private subsystem
group has relatively more bene￿ciaries in the regions of Lisbon and Algarve.
4 Econometric framework
Econometrics of count data has its own modelling strategies in which discreteness and
non-negativity are taken into account. Moreover, in the "count world" it is common
that features other than location depend on the covariates, making the estimation of the
conditional expectation poorer in the sense that provides very little information about
the impact of the regressors on the outcome of interest. In this context it is potentially
interesting to study the e⁄ect of regressors not only on the mean but also on single
outcomes and in the full distribution.
Within the vast literature on count data it is possible to ￿nd two general categories
of methods that allow a complete description of the conditional distribution of a count
outcome. Following the early work of Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), several fully
parametric probabilistic models, like Poisson and negative binomial regressions, have been
developed in order to describe the e⁄ect of the covariates on di⁄erent points of a count
distribution. These regressions allow inferences for all possible aspects of the outcome
variable (including the computation of the marginal probability e⁄ects). However, to do
it, they impose restrictive parametric assumptions on the way the independent variables
a⁄ect the outcome variable. As a consequence, this approach usually faces a lack of
robustness problem, even when ￿ exible models like the hurdle or latent class models
are applied. Given these limitations, it can be attractive to use non- or semiparametric
techniques that freely approximate the conditional distribution. This can be achieved with
18the estimation of conditional quantile functions, a technique that has been applied in the
context of continuous regression for a long time (Koenker and Bassett 1978). Following
the contributions of Manski (1975), Manski (1985) and Horowitz (1992) regarding binary
models, some e⁄ort is being made to extend the method to discrete data. Recently, the
seminal work of Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) succeeded in applying the quantile
framework to count data models.
Since our main aim is to assess the e⁄ect of the subsystems in di⁄erent parts of the
outcome distribution without imposing a probabilistic structure, the "Quantile for counts"
regression model is a natural choice. In order to better understand its advantages (and
disadvantages) we compare the implications drawn from the quantile regression approach
with those from parametric count data models that have been used quite extensively in the
analysis of health care. In this section we ￿rst present a brief description of such models
(the minimum necessary to support the correct interpretation of results). A natural
starting point is the Poisson regression model, followed by negative binomial models.
Abandoning the rigid single index structure of these conventional approaches, we present
two-part models, in particular the Hurdle and zero-in￿ ated models. To model the number
of visits to a doctor, the hurdle is usually set at zero. In fact, in the health care literature
the zeros can be interpreted as a result of the individual decision to be user or non-user
(in principle motivated by the existence of sickness episodes), and the intensity of usage is
more likely to result from patient choice in￿ uenced by doctor·s opinion. Recently, several
works (e.g. Louren￿o 2007, Deb and Trivedi 2002 and Bago-d￿ Uva 2006) are applying
a ￿nite discrete mixture model (not continuous, like the negative binomial distribution),
frequently called latent class model. In this framework, it is assumed that the observed
data is a mixture of a ￿nite number of subpopulations. In the case of two classes, the
estimation splits the population into what the literature entitle "high" and "low" users,
according to the intensity of usage. When compared with two-part models that have a
clear dichotomy between users and non-users, these models are mainly driven by statistical
reasoning (JimØnez-Mart￿n, Lebeaga, and Martinez-Granado 2002) and are often a more
suitable approach for panel data. This last feature made us exclude its application as a
benchmark to the cross sectional data derived from the PHS.
194.1 Parametric models for counts
4.1.1 Poisson regression model15
"The Poisson regression model is the benchmark model for count data in much
the same way as the normal linear model is the benchmark for real-valued
continuous data." Winkelmann (2008)
For each i = 1;2;3;:::;N, let yi be a dependent count random variable and xi a vector
of independent variables. In a Poisson regression model it is assumed that the probability
function of yi, conditional on the vector of covariates xi, is a Poisson distribution. Density
is fully determined after the speci￿cation of the conditional mean (￿i) which is usually
parameterized as an exponential of a linear function, dependent on the vector of regressors
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E(yijxi) = ￿i = exp(x
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i￿) (2)
The literature often criticizes the Poisson regression model by not incorporating the indi-
vidual unobserved heterogeneity. This happens because it is characterized by the mean-
variance equality, known as "equidispersion", which is seldom or never veri￿ed in empirical
applications, that usually ￿nd "overdispersion" (Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995, Winkelmann
2006). The "excess of zeros" is another problem, since a high frequency of zeros, often
observed in count data, is not consistent with the Poisson regression. Here, we compute
robust standard errors, following the pseudo maximum likelihood (Gourieroux, Monfort,
and Trognon 1984). Thus if the mean function is correctly speci￿ed, then maximum
likelihood estimation based on any distribution in the class of linear exponential families
provides a consistent estimator of ￿ even if the model is otherwise misspeci￿ed. Note that,
by using the pseudo maximum likelihood it is not possible to overcome the drawbacks
of goodness of ￿t, either "overdispersion" or "excess os zeros". Winkelmann (2006) em-
phasizes that the single crossing property of the Poisson regression model imposes a very
restrictive probability change in response to a variation in covariates, concluding that it
15A complete characterization can be found in Winkelmann (2008), pp. 7-26 and pp. 63-126.
20is not very well suited when the focus is on modelling the full probability response to a
change in a regressor.
4.1.2 Negative binomial models16
A natural extension of the Poisson regression model is the continuous mixture models
for unobserved heterogeneity. The negative binomial (Negbin) distribution is the most
commonly used. It can be characterized as a continuous Poisson-gamma mixture, obtained
by allowing the Poisson average population parameter ￿i to change randomly across the













where ￿i is a positive dispersion parameter, and ￿i is the conditional expectation,
de￿ned as before. The Negbin model is constructed by specifying both parameters in
terms of exogenous variables (xi) in which overdispersion (variance exceeds the mean) is
contemplated. There are at least two di⁄erent ways of introducing dispersion that conduct
to two di⁄erent values.
NegbinI : V ar(yijxi) = ￿i(1 + ￿
￿1
i ) (4)





Both Negbin models are fully parametric and the use of a gamma function to account
for unobserved heterogeneity is only due to statistical convenience. Additionally, it still
does not account for the "excess of zeros", while the single crossing property remains
exactly like in the Poisson case.
Another increasingly popular count data model is the Poisson-log-normal. Although
facing the same problems it tends to dominate the Negbin framework in what regards to
the goodness of ￿t.
16A complete characterization can be found in Winkelmann (2008), pp.20-26 and pp. 127-142.
214.1.3 Two-part models17
It is potentially interesting to study the e⁄ect of regressors not only on the mean, but also
on single outcomes,the most prominent of which are zeros. Standard count data models
presented above are too restrictive to properly model zeros (problem of "excess zeros").
The literature points to two-part models as the most suitable solution to this problem.
These models assume that consumption decisions are made in two steps. The framework is
specially known by its empirical advantages, but there are also strong theoretical reasons
in favour of this speci￿cation, related with the fact that zeros can often re￿ ect corner
solutions in economic choice models, making the zeros eventually dependent on other
driving forces.
The Hurdle regression model is the best known two-part model. It was ￿rstly proposed
by Mullahy (1986), who presented a count data model with a decision structure similar to
of the overall Cragg model. In most applications the hurdle is set at zero, assuming that
zeros result from a di⁄erent process, creating a clear distinction between no consumption
and positive consumption. This model is a ￿nite discrete mixture that combines di⁄er-
ent probability functions for zeros and positive integers, allowing underdispersion and





1￿f1(0jxi) for yi>0 (6)
where f0(0jxi) = Pr(yi = 0jxi) and f1(yijxi;yi > 0) is the truncated distribution. Dif-
ferent probability functions for f0(:) and f1(:) lead to di⁄erent speci￿cations of the Hurdle
model. For the ￿rst part the most common speci￿cations are the Poisson, Negbin or bi-
nary models like logit and probit, while for the second part it is usually used a Poisson or a
Negbin. In this work, besides the Poisson Hurdle model that uses a complementary loglog
for f0(0jxi) and a zero truncated Poisson for f1(yijxi;yi > 0 , we will estimate a probit
and logit for f0(0jxi) and a zero truncated Negbin I and II. These models although fully
parametrized and strongly dependent on the assumption that zeros and positive values
result from di⁄erent processes, are more ￿ exible than the one-part models in what regards
to the single crossing property. Indeed, it can be proved that the marginal probability
e⁄ects can switch signs twice (Winkelmann 2008).
17A complete characterization can be found in Winkelmann (2008), pp.173-193.
22Another group of two-part models are the zero-in￿ ated class of models, which also
address the problem of "excess of zeros". Their di⁄erence relative to Hurdle models is
that they assume zeros to be generated from two di⁄erent processes, based on the idea
that an individual will be willing to utilise but in a second stage, although admitting to
consume strictly positive quantities decide not to do so. Sometimes literature refers to
the two types of zeros as strategic and incidental. This framework uses the same kind of
models for the ￿rst part and for the second part count distributions not truncated. In
this work we will estimate zero-in￿ ated Poisson and zero-in￿ ated Negbin II. The choice
between Hurdle and zero-in￿ ated models can be made on substantive or statistical grounds
(for instance, by using the Vuong test for nested models).
4.2 Quantile regression for counts
The models presented in the last subsection are not as informative as conditional quantiles.
They are conceived to study the impact on the mean - the information on the distribution
of the relevant outcomes is determined either by the conditional expectation or by the
"arbitrarily" distribution chosen (e.g. Poisson, Negbin). Quite recently the quantile
regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978) was extended to count data (Machado and Santos-
Silva 2005) through the conjugation of a nondi⁄erentiable sample objective function with
a discrete dependent variable.
Let y be a count random variable and their ￿-quantile de￿ned as:
Qy(￿) = min[￿jP(y ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿] where 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 (7)
The ￿-quantile has the same discrete support as y and cannot be a continuous function
of the covariates (x). Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) suggested a procedure known as
￿jittering￿to arti￿cially impose some degree of smoothness. The basic idea is to build a
continuous auxiliary variable (y￿) whose quantiles have a one-to-one known relationship
with the quantiles of the count variable of interest. The y￿ is obtained by adding to the
count variable a uniform random variable, independent of y and x:18
18Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) showed that there is a little loss of generality in assuming that U
is uniform. In fact they argue that it is possible to choose another distribution for U as long as it has
a support on [0;1) and a density function bounded away from 0. The advantages of using a uniform
distribution are purely algebraic and computational.
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￿ = y + u where u ￿ uniform[0;1) (8)
The continuity problem of the dependant variable is solved but the derivatives are
not continuous for integer values of y￿. Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) proved that
given some regularity conditions, valid asymptotic inference is possible. Among those
conditions, it is particularly relevant the existence of at least one continuously distributed
covariate. The standard quantile regression is applied to a monotonic transformation of
y￿ that ensures that the estimated quantiles are non-negative and the transformation is
linear in the parameters of a vector of regressors.
In order to implement the procedures, the authors suggest the following parametric
representation of the ￿-quantile of y￿:
Qy￿(￿jx) = ￿ + exp[x
0￿(￿)]; 0 ￿ ￿ < 1: (9)
The reason for adding ￿ to the right side is that y￿ is bounded from below at ￿ due
to the way it is constructed. The exponential form is traditionally assumed in count data
models. We believe that this speci￿cation provides a good parsimonious approximation
to the unknown conditional quantile functions. The linear transformation is speci￿ed as:
QT(y￿;￿)(￿jx) = x
0￿(￿); (10)
where T(y￿;￿) = f
log(y￿￿￿) for y￿>￿
log(") for y￿￿￿ ; being " a small positive number (0 < " < ￿).19
This is feasible because quantiles are equivariant to monotonic transformations and
to censoring from below up to the quantile of interest. The vector of covariates ￿(￿) is
obtained as a solution to a standard quantile regression of a linear transformed variable







i￿] where ￿￿(v) = v [￿ ￿ I(v < 0)]: (11)
Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) proved that although the quantile regression is not
di⁄erentiable everywhere, the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal:
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with A = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)E(XX0) and D = E [fT(X0￿(￿)jX)X0X], where fT denotes the
conditional density of T(y￿;￿) given X.
Because "noise" has been arti￿cially created for technical reasons, Machado and
Santos-Silva (2005) suggest a Monte Carlo procedure - an "average-jittering" - which con-
sists in obtaining an estimator that is the average of m independent "jittering" samples
with the same size. The di⁄erence between samples is the dependent variable y￿ because
it is created as the sum of y (constant between samples) with m di⁄erent draws of the
uniform distribution. The main advantage of this procedure is that the resulting estimator
is more e¢ cient than the one obtained from a single draw and a misspeci￿cation-robust
estimator of the covariance matrix is available.
The importance of this procedure derives from the possibility of performing inferences
on the variable of interest y. Machado and Santos-Silva (2005) showed that marginal
e⁄ects of the smoothed variable y￿ are easily obtained and interpreted and that there is
a correspondence between the two quantile functions:
Qy(￿jx) = dQy￿(￿jx) ￿ 1e, where dae denotes the ceiling function (returns the smallest
integer greater than, or equal to a).
Because of the monotone transformation of y￿( T(y￿;￿)), the relationship between
coe¢ cient estimates b ￿(￿) and y￿and y is essentially non-linear, making it hard to interpret
b ￿(￿) in terms of y￿ and y. It is possible to test the null hypothesis that a covariate has
no e⁄ect on Qy(￿jx) because it is equivalent to test whether the variable has no impact
on the Qy￿(￿jx). The problem is when the variable is signi￿cant in Qy￿(￿jx). In such
case it could be non signi￿cant in the conditional quantile of y.20 This occurs because
di⁄erent quantiles of y￿correspond to the same quantiles of y. In fact, a change in xj will
a⁄ect Qy(￿jx) only if it is capable of changing the integer part of Qy￿(￿jx). Machado and
Santos-Silva (2005) call this "magnifying glass e⁄ect" of Qy￿(￿jx).
20It is not possible to just look at ￿j, as it becomes necessary to evaluate case by case if a given
magnitude in xj induces changes in the ￿-quantile of y. Inference about the partial e⁄ect of a particular
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254.3 Empirical speci￿cation
The conditional quantiles used in our analysis are de￿ned as
Qy￿
i (￿jx) = ￿ + exp[￿0(￿) + ￿1(￿)pubsubi + ￿2(￿)privsubi + ￿(￿)zi];0 ￿ ￿ < 1 (13)
where pubsubi and privsubi indicate if a person bene￿t from double coverage through
a "public insurance health subsystem" or a "private insurance health subsystem", respec-
tively. The vector zi includes all other characteristics that were controlled for in this
regression.21 In addition to all independent variables referred in Section 3.2, we use a
third order polynomial in "age" and a third order polynomial in "age" crossed with the
gender variable (age ￿ female).
Our main focus will be on the coe¢ cients ￿1(￿) and ￿2(￿). They measure the impact
of additional layers of health insurance (on top of the statutory NHS) on the utilisation of
visits to a physician, by re￿ ecting the di⁄erences in consumption patterns between NHS
and public and private subsystems. This empirical work gives some evidence regarding
the e⁄ects of a potential reform in the Portuguese health care system. We can state
our interest as to measure the potential impact of the elimination of double coverage
on the utilisation of health services, i.e. the potential decrease in doctors consultations
amongst the subsystems bene￿ciaries due to their insurance status. When compared to the
general treatment e⁄ects techniques, our analysis lacks on a certain features. For instance,
when studing the impact of a reform is frequent the usage of panel data comparing the
outcome before and after the reform (e.g. Winkelmann (2006)).22 Nevertheless, we have
a important positive distinctive feature. By analyzing not only the mean e⁄ect but also
the impact on the whole outcome distribution, we present an improvement over past
research methodology by showing that mean treatment e⁄ects can "miss a lot". The
advantages of applying a quantile regression approach go further than just statistical
convenience. Using this technique we are able to study the heterogeneity of the e⁄ect of
double coverage, without imposing any a priori distributional structure. In fact, Bitler
21The vector of coe¢ cients is now ￿(￿) = [￿0(￿);￿1(￿);￿2(￿);￿ (￿)] , being ￿0(￿); ￿1(￿); ￿2(￿)
scalars and ￿ (￿) a vector.
22In such case, the typical empirical strategies include pre-reform/post-reform di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
where one compares the changes in the utilization between a⁄ected and una⁄ected sub-populations. A
drawback in our analysis relative to more general approaches is that we estimate the impact in 2005-2006,
which may change in case of di⁄erent time paths between groups.
26et al. (2006) showed that unlike what is usually done in the majority of welfare reform
studies that rely on estimating mean impacts, it is necessary to allow for heterogenous
treatment e⁄ects, in which the quantile regression methodology can play a very useful role.
In our case, with quantile regression we can see if the impact of the health subsystems
di⁄ers accordingly with the level of utilisation of doctor visits, which gives insight of what
can happen in case of a reform.
Our speci￿cation is consistent with the measurement of the double coverage e⁄ect
in the case of ignorability of the treatment conditional on a set of covariates (zi) and
we arguee that there is no reasons to believe that di⁄erent health insurance status have
distinct distributions of unobservable determinants of health care utilisation.23 Moreover,
when selecting the variables we guarantee that treated (public and private subsystems
bene￿ciaries) and untreated (NHS bene￿ciaries) groups have a common support by using
only observations in the intersection of the domains. This means that it is necessary
to have subpopulations in each age-state: NHS, privsub and pubsub (see Wooldridge
(2002) for details). This procedure made us exclude from the population of interest
individuals with more than 80 years old. Another problem that can rise is the strong
correlation between some potential regressors and the treatment dummies. One of the
cases that deserved special attention is the unemployment status. See robustness analysis
in Appendix D.
In general, the estimation of insurance e⁄ects can be erroneous if the researcher ignores
the adverse selection role in the decision to obtain health protection. In such case, it
creates an endogeneity problem that results in an overestimation of the impact. The par-
ticular features of the Portuguese subsystems gather conditions to consider the variables
￿1(￿) and ￿2(￿) exogenous, i.e. not correlated with the bene￿ciaries health status. This
happens because membership on public and private health subsystems was mandatory
and based on professional category, and as such unrelated to the expected value of future
health care consumption. Note that even the contributions are based on income (and
not on risk characteristics of each individual) and it is very implausible that individuals
want to work as public employees or in companies with private subsystems just to ben-
e￿t from this additional health insurance, especially if one takes into account that, by
23In fact, the assumption of ignorability conditional on the set of covariates (zi) is naturally dependent
on the inexistence of unobservable characteristics (omitted variables) with a di⁄erent distribution among
subsystems.
27default, people are covered by a health care protection system (NHS). It is also unlikely
that employers choose individuals on the basis of unobservable variables related to their
health or even household health. The only requirement is that the potential employee
is suitable for the job and has no infectious disease which could be controlled through
our set of pre-determined variables. Previous studies using data for Portugal defended
the exogeneity of the covariates indicating if the individuals bene￿t from a subsystem
(e.g. Barros et al. 2008 and Louren￿o 2007). Jones, Koolman, and van Doorslaer (2006)
analysed the e⁄ect of supplementary insurance on the probability of visiting a specialist
physician, allowing for potential endogeneity of the insurance variable and, for Portugal,
they conclude that the increased probability of utilisation is not due to selection e⁄ects.
In spite of this evidence, the appropriateness of the exogeneity assumption was tested in a
sensitivity analysis exercise that consisted on running models on spouses and descendants
only (see Appendix E for details).
The insurance covariates can capture two e⁄ects that underestimate the impact of
double coverage. Firstly, the fact that the subsystems bene￿ciaries enjoy more or better
treatment than NHS bene￿ciaries may decrease the future consumption of health care
(Barros et al. 2008 and Vera-HernÆndez 1999). This is because over lifetime, better
health care would translate into a signi￿cant accumulation of health advantages not totally
captured in the other controlled variables.24 This issue will be addressed in Section 5.3,
by restricting the analysis to young bene￿ciaries who did not yet had time to accumulate
such advantages and compare the results with those of the larger sample. Finally, another
important comment of the double coverage coe¢ cients is that they cannot be totally
associated with a moral hazard behaviour but instead to a joint e⁄ect of moral hazard
from the bene￿ciaries and supply-induced demand by the providers. The latter is related
to the fact that doctors for patients with health subsystems may require more tests in
order to justify more visits. With our dataset it is not possible to distinguish between the
contact and frequency decisions that, if possible, would help to isolate the supply-induced
demand of the suppliers from the "pure" demand from the patients. However, according
to Barros et al. (2008), the payments to subsystems providers are relatively low so the
magnitude of this e⁄ect will be very small. Independently of that, the important point
24This is likely for the Portuguese case, since before 1979, the State only covered the costs of health
care for civil servants and this fact implies that the elder cohorts of subsystems bene￿ciaries received
relatively better access to health care in comparison with the NHS counterparts.
28here is to capture how much the system design increases the utilisation of resources related




In this section we present the results of the parametric count data models mentioned in
section 4.1. All models were estimated using the maximum likelihood method (or pseudo-
maximum likelihood).26 The software used was STATA. Starting with single crossing
log-linear regressions group, Table B1 of Appendix B presents the results for the Poisson
pseudo-likelihood, the Negbin I and II, and for the Poisson log-normal model. The esti-
mated e⁄ects are generally similar across speci￿cations. Health insurance semi-elasticities
vary from 5.6 to 6.7 per cent and from 15.0 to 18.7 per cent in the public and private
subsystems, respectively. An interesting ￿nding is that the ratio between private and
public subsystems remains almost unchanged at 2.6-2.8. Among the health status vari-
ables, only the dummy "smoker" is not signi￿cant at the ￿ve per cent level in the Poisson
and Negbin II. In addition to that, estimates are similar across regressions, while the
dummies "limited", "renailfailure" and "infarction" have the highest relative di⁄erences.
Discrepancies between estimates are even lower in the case of socioeconomic regressors, in
particular, the e⁄ect of age is amazingly identical. In that group of variables, the impacts
of education and income are not signi￿cant in some models. Geographic and seasonality
e⁄ects are signi￿cant (except for the di⁄erence between "summer" and "autumn", the
latter being the default season) and do not change considerably among regressions.
In a second stage of this preliminary analysis we compute the two-part models. Table
B2 of Appendix B shows the results for the hurdle formulation.27 Regarding the Pois-
25For comparability reasons we use the same set of regressors. In the two-part models the set is
included in both equations. The economic interpretation will be made in the next section with the
quantile regression results.
26The maximum likelihood estimator is the one that maximizes the likelihood function, which is the
product of the individual densities conditional of the covariates (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The models
belong to the linear exponential family can be estimated by maximum pseudo-likelihood, which does
not depend on the particular densities. It just depends on the conditional mean being well speci￿ed
(Gourieroux et al. 1984).
27Hurdle models can be estimated in two separated parts. We include all regressors to estimate both
29son Hurdle model, the ￿rst impressive fact is that health subsystems dummies are not
signi￿cant in the second equation (specially the public type), which means that health
insurance plans in￿ uence the decision to consult a doctor but after wards they do not seem
to have impact on the quantity of subsequent visits. In what concerns the health status
regressors it should be mentioned that while being handicapped seems relevant explaining
the number of visits, it does not in￿ uence the initial decision, whereas the smoker and
eating habits may not have an impact on the number of visits, but only on the probability
of visiting a doctor. Finally, most socioeconomic characteristics are not important in the
second part of the model. This result seems to corroborate that after deciding to visit a
doctor the quantity of consultations may depend on the doctor￿ s opinion. Apart from the
Poisson Hurdle framework, other speci￿cations were estimated, in particular, the f0(0jxi)
was tested with a probit and logit distributions, and the f1(yijxi;yi > 0) was modeled
with a zero truncated Negbin I and II. Among the di⁄erent distributions, the results for
the probability of having no visits to a doctor are very similar regarding the signi￿cance
of the independent variables. Furthermore, the probit estimates are analogous to the ones
derived from the complementary loglog (f0(0jxi) of the Poisson Hurdle model). In what
concerns the positively valued observations of the dependent variable, the signi￿cance of
the regressors is also similar even though some di⁄erences exist in the estimates. Public
plan remains not signi￿cant in explaining the expected number of visits when one decides
to visit the doctor, while the private plan seems to have a positive e⁄ect (signi￿cant at
the 5 per cent level) if the real distribution is a zero truncated Negbin I. With the same
distribution, the impact of age is also signi￿cant, unlike the results obtained with zero
truncated Poisson and zero truncated Negbin II.
Finally, table B3 of Appendix B presents the results using two di⁄erent models: zero-
in￿ ated Poisson and zero-in￿ ated Negbin II. Overall, the dummies controlling for the
health insurance plan are not signi￿cant, however, at a con￿dence level of 5 per cent, the
e⁄ect of private subsystem is di⁄erent from zero in the in￿ ated part (of the model ￿rst
equation that determines whether the count is zero). Regarding the signi￿cance of health
status variables, the results are similar to the ones of the Hurdle framework (although
the values of the estimates, the results vary a lot between the two speci￿cations). The
the binary model using indicator variable d (where d = 1 if y = 0 and d = 0 else) and the truncated
model using the subsample of positive counts only. This feature di⁄ers from the zero-in￿ ated framework
that cannot be estimated in di⁄erent parts.
30socioeconomic characteristics are overall more important in explaining the in￿ ated part
since the decision on the number of visits is only in￿ uenced by the dummy "retired" and
by age (but not by a third order polynomial).
Models can be compared and evaluated at di⁄erent levels. Most of the models are non-
nested, with the exception of the Poisson and the Negbin models. This implies that we
will have to use criteria as the Bayes Information Criteria (BIC), the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC), which are popular
measures for comparing maximum likelihood models that account for the fact that the
number of parameters di⁄ers across speci￿cations. Table B4 of Appendix B shows the
log-likelihood and the selection criteria for the di⁄erent models. Among the one-part
models, the Poisson log-normal is preferred. Note that the likelihood ratio test clearly
rejects the Poisson model against the other single crossing models. Moreover, the Negbin
dispersion parameter (either constant or dependent on the mean in Negbin I and II,
respectively) is clearly di⁄erent from zero thus allowing to reject the Poisson hypothesis
of equivariance (see Table B1 of Appendix B).28 These results corroborate the ￿ndings
of other works (e.g. Winkelmann (2004) and Deb and Trivedi (2002)) that use similar
dependent variable. Results from the two-part models indicate that when compared with
its zero-in￿ ated peers, the Hurdle models are preferred and the speci￿cations that use the
Poisson distribution are worse than the ones that use the Negbin speci￿cation.29
5.2 Quantile regression results
Estimations were performed with the qcount package of STATA (Miranda 2006) after
some slight adjustments. Regarding the number of jittered samples used to obtain the
results, preliminary experiments showed that the coe¢ cients are not very sensitive to a
particular sample of uniform random variables used to jitter the data: with 1500 samples
almost no changes were detected both in coe¢ cients and in standard deviations.30 The
decision of which quantiles to compute took into account the problem under analysis and
the empirical distribution of the relevant outcome. Since the marginal quantiles are zero
for all ￿ 6 0:50, it becomes more interesting to compute conditional quantiles on the
28The goodness-of-￿t ￿2 (Gilbert 1992) also tells us that we can reject the hypothesis that this data is
Poisson distributed.
29To analyse a particular relationship between two Hurdle models we can also use Vuong tests.
30This result was no surprising due to the high number of observations of our database.
31upper tail of the distribution where the e⁄ect of covariates changes rapidly. Note that in
the lower tail, a variation in the conditional quantiles of the arti￿cial outcome Qy￿(￿jx)
may be mostly due to the random noise that has been added and as a result we expect
to ￿nd quantiles more ￿ at. Moreover, it is economically more interesting to look at the
behaviour of individuals who make heavy use of health care. In this scenario, and despite
the fact that we will still be presenting the ￿rst quartile, we will focus on quantiles above
the median, and accordingly we will compute results for each decile after the median.
Table IV presents the parameter estimates of the quantiles regressions (the corre-
sponding standard errors are shown in Table C1 of the Appendix C). As we can see,
quantile regression does not restrict the way regressors a⁄ect di⁄erent regions of the dis-
tribution, allowing the assessment of whether health insurance systems have signi￿cant
and variable impacts over the di⁄erent outcomes. The signs of the regressors do not
switch across the di⁄erent quantiles (except for the dummy "summer", whose e⁄ect, al-
beit highly insigni￿cant, is positive in the lower tail and becomes negative in the upper
quantiles). All variables are signi￿cant in at least one quantile and when compared with
the previous one-part models, we conclude that the regressors that were signi￿cant in
those ones are also signi￿cant in the quantile regressions. In the group of health status
regressors, the covariates that control for current medical conditions are highly signi￿cant
as expected. Among the chronic diseases dummies, only the cerebral hemorrhage e⁄ect is
not signi￿cant in quantiles above the 0:7y￿￿ quantile. Concerning the indicators related
to attitudes with impact on health status, we ￿nd that both the number of meals and
smoking habits are insigni￿cant in the upper tail of the distribution. In the case of so-
cioeconomic characteristics, the statistical signi￿cance is, to a large extent, lower in both
tails of the distribution. Most of the variables related to the region of residence and to
seasonality e⁄ects have a signi￿cant impact on the consumption of visits to doctors.













Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.078 0.088 0.095 0.096 0.073 0.055y
privsub 0.200 0.229 0.247 0.232 0.185 0.148
Health status variables
sick 0.680 0.602 0.590 0.601 0.547 0.772
limitdays 0.071 0.073 0.076 0.074 0.071 0.073
limited 0.136y 0.205y 0.247 0.321 0.335 0.368
rheumatism 0.134 0.140 0.139 0.140 0.148 0.150
osteoporosis 0.282 0.207 0.182 0.152 0.115 0.091
cancer 0.468 0.464 0.430 0.386 0.403 0.525
kidneystones 0.149 0.154 0.175 0.188 0.221 0.211
renalfailure 0.167z 0.220 0.212 0.226 0.260 0.234
emphysema 0.090z 0.210 0.222 0.227 0.232 0.238
cerebralhemorrhage 0.133y 0.135y 0.134y 0.163 0.191 0.189
infarction 0.228 0.327 0.343 0.341 0.290 0.217
depressivedisorder 0.187 0.231 0.247 0.253 0.246 0.248
otherchronicaldisease 0.435 0.451 0.471 0.458 0.384 0.352
highbloodpressure 0.407 0.382 0.367 0.322 0.260 0.208
chronicpain 0.172 0.197 0.220 0.230 0.221 0.224
diabetes 0.449 0.368 0.340 0.316 0.293 0.292
asthma 0.290 0.325 0.339 0.340 0.275 0.230
stress 0.441 0.360 0.342 0.305 0.293 0.250
smoker -0.205 -0.176 -0.168 -0.154 -0.095 -0.034z
meals 0.188 0.158 0.129 0.114 0.081y 0.070y
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.063 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.039 -0.017y
age -1.072 -1.014 -1.048 -1.071 -0.727 -0.559
age2 0.234 0.222 0.231 0.241 0.160 0.121
age3 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.010 -0.007
age￿female 0.558 0.580 0.641 0.750 0.490 0.335
(age￿female)2 -0.120 -0.129 -0.146 -0.181 -0.116 -0.078
(age￿female)3 0.007z 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.005y
female -0.321y -0.321 -0.345 -0.357 -0.216 -0.091z
educmax 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.005y
lincome 0.069 0.058 0.060 0.060 0.053 0.030z
single -0.218 -0.198 -0.202 -0.218 -0.164 -0.116
student -0.252 -0.246 -0.272 -0.253 -0.179 -0.172
retired 0.168 0.149 0.134 0.115 0.120 0.143
Geographic variables
Norte -0.052z -0.036z -0.045z -0.043z -0.055z -0.095
Lisboa -0.087y -0.066y -0.081y -0.086 -0.092 -0.105
Alentejo -0.273 -0.221 -0.221 -0.193 -0.157 -0.142
Algarve -0.248 -0.204 -0.196 -0.168 -0.145 -0.166
A￿ores -0.371 -0.343 -0.363 -0.382 -0.338 -0.352
Madeira -0.534 -0.514 -0.561 -0.612 -0.518 -0.483
Seasonality
winter 0.171 0.173 0.178 0.172 0.137 0.146
spring 0.093 0.093 0.099 0.092 0.071 0.068
summer 0.048z 0.037z 0.024z 0.000z -0.020z -0.002z
Constant -1.018 -0.406 -0.165z 0.126z 0.270y 0.657
Notes: Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not signi￿cant at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respec-
tively. Standard errors are available in Table C1 of Appendix C.
33We now turn to the analysis of the magnitude of the e⁄ects under analysis. The direct
interpretation of Table IV may suggest some misleading conclusions. Note that
_
￿(￿) is
a vector of linear partial e⁄ects on QT(y￿; ￿)(￿jx). To fully understand the impacts, the
analysis should be made through Qy￿(￿jx), which is not so easily computed due to its
non-linearity as well as to the fact that it is a function of ￿￿quantile. Given its non-
linearity, the parameter provides an incomplete picture of the covariates￿e⁄ects on the
shape of the distribution. Furthermore, the fact that it is a function of ￿ implies, for
instance, that a variable with the same estimated coe¢ cient in all quantiles will have a
proportional e⁄ect that varies with ￿￿quantile. A possible way to take into account the
non-linearity is to compute partial e⁄ects for speci￿c individuals, say e x. Inference for the
marginal e⁄ect of a dummy xj given that all other variables remain ￿xed at e x is made
through Qy￿(￿je x;xj = 1) ￿ Q￿




[Qy￿(￿je x) ￿ ￿] and for
a continuous variable xl is ￿l(￿)[Qy￿(￿je x) ￿ ￿].31 To facilitate the comparison of e⁄ects
across di⁄erent ￿ we also compute the semi-elasticities of Qy￿(￿je x), which is done simply
by taking the ratio of the partial e⁄ect to Qy￿(￿je x). Table V shows the results for a
speci￿c individual, say the "default" individual, who is de￿ned by setting the continuous
variables at the sample median and the dummy variables equal to zero.32
Results from the parametric models are not directly comparable with the results from
the quantile regressions. First, with parametric models it is estimated the expected values
and it is possible to compute some outcomes, whereas the quantile regression provides
results across quantiles. Another important di⁄erence is that the marginal e⁄ects are
slightly di⁄erent due to the fact that we work with Qy￿(￿jx) which is a function of a
constant (￿) that changes across quantiles. The comparison between models must be
indirect (e.g. through the measurement of the impact of one covariate in terms of the
e⁄ect of other variable). Amongst parametric models, the ones more easily comparable
with the quantile regression models are the two-part models, since they allow at least
31Table C2 of Appendix C presents the results. The marginal e⁄ects of some covariates are calculated in




[Qy￿(￿je x) ￿ ￿],
the "age when male" that is set as [￿age(￿)+2￿age2(￿)￿age+3￿age3(￿)￿age2]￿[Qy￿(￿je x) ￿ ￿], and the
"age when female" that is [￿age(￿)+￿agexfemale(￿)+2(￿age2(￿)+￿(agexfemale)2(￿))￿age+3(￿age3(￿)+
￿(agexfemale)3(￿)) ￿ age2] ￿ [Qy￿(￿je x) ￿ ￿]:
32The "default" individual is a healthy man with a household of 3 persons, 9 years of schooling, e500 of
monthly income, not single or retired, living in the Centre region of Portugal and interviewed in autumn.
Also note that, the vector e x is set with the dummies pubsub and privsub equal to zero, so the "default"
individual has the NHS insurance plan (belongs the control group). It is worth mentioning that setting
the continuous variables at the median or at the mean produces very similar marginal e⁄ects.
34more than one crossing.33
Table V: Quantile regression results: semi-elasticities (SE)
SE(0.25) SE(0.50) SE(0.60) SE(0.70) SE(0.80) SE(0.90)
Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.027 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.031
privsub 0.072 0.082 0.093 0.096 0.093 0.087
Health status variables
sick 0.316 0.264 0.266 0.302 0.332 0.633
limitdays 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.033 0.041
limited 0.047 0.073 0.093 0.139 0.181 0.242
rheumatism 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.055 0.072 0.088
osteoporosis 0.106 0.073 0.066 0.060 0.056 0.052
cancer 0.194 0.189 0.178 0.172 0.226 0.376
kidneystones 0.052 0.053 0.063 0.076 0.112 0.128
renalfailure 0.059 0.079 0.078 0.093 0.135 0.143
emphysema 0.031 0.075 0.082 0.093 0.119 0.146
cerebralhemorrhage 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.065 0.096 0.113
infarction 0.113 0.123 0.135 0.149 0.153 0.131
depressivedisorder 0.067 0.083 0.092 0.105 0.127 0.153
otherchronicaldisease 0.177 0.182 0.199 0.213 0.213 0.229
highbloodpressure 0.163 0.149 0.147 0.139 0.135 0.125
chronicpain 0.061 0.070 0.081 0.095 0.113 0.137
diabetes 0.184 0.142 0.134 0.136 0.155 0.184
asthma 0.109 0.122 0.134 0.148 0.144 0.140
stress 0.180 0.138 0.135 0.131 0.155 0.154
smoker -0.060 -0.052 -0.051 -0.052 -0.041 -0.018
meals 0.067 0.055 0.045 0.044 0.039 0.039
Socioeconomic characteristics variables
householdsize -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.018 -0.009
age when male* 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003
age when female* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
female 0.152 0.147 0.164 0.201 0.171 0.172
educmax 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003
income** 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004
single -0.064 -0.057 -0.060 -0.072 -0.069 -0.060
student -0.072 -0.070 -0.079 -0.082 -0.075 -0.086
retired 0.059 0.051 0.047 0.045 0.058 0.084
Geographic variables
Norte -0.016 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.024 -0.049
Lisboa -0.027 -0.020 -0.026 -0.030 -0.040 -0.054
Alentejo -0.078 -0.063 -0.066 -0.064 -0.066 -0.072
Algarve -0.071 -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.061 -0.083
A￿ores -0.101 -0.093 -0.101 -0.116 -0.131 -0.161
Madeira -0.134 -0.128 -0.142 -0.168 -0.184 -0.208
Seasonality variables
winter 0.060 0.060 0.065 0.069 0.067 0.086
spring 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.038
summer 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.001
Notes: Semi-elasticities marked with * or ** were multiplied by 10 or 100, respectively.
33The comparison with one-part models should be done by looking at the quantiles near the mean.
35As we have already mentioned, in the quantile regression framework it is possible
that a signi￿cant coe¢ cient of a variable on y￿
￿￿ quantile does not a⁄ect a particular
conditional y￿￿ quantile. Nevertheless, when it is found that the y￿
￿￿ quantile depends
on the covariate for several quantiles, then it should be possible to detect a subpopulation
for which the semi-elasticity on y￿￿ quantile is di⁄erent from zero (Machado and Santos-
Silva (2005) and Miranda (2008)). For clarity take the following example, if we consider
the median and compute the Qy￿(0:50jx = e x) we obtain 0:73 and as a consequence the
Qy(0:50jx = e x) is equal to zero consultations. When considering an individual equal to
the "default" except that he has diabetes, then Qy￿ is higher (0:84), but the estimated
median for that individual is still zero. Hence the marginal e⁄ect of "diabetes" on the
y￿￿ quantile is zero, even though it has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on the y￿
￿￿ quantile.
Conversely, if the sixth decile is used the Qy￿(0:60jx = e x) is equal to 0:90 and as a
consequence Qy(0:60jx = e x) is also equal to zero consultations. But now, a diabetic has
Qy￿ equal to 1:03, making Qy equal to one consultation which means that the estimated
impact of diabetes on the sixth decile of the outcome distribution is one additional visit
to a doctor.
Starting with the impact of double coverage, it is visible that the insurance coe¢ cients
do not change a lot across the estimated quantiles, but it is possible to ￿nd a pattern: both
public and private subsystems have an increasing positive e⁄ect on the number of doctor
visits until the sixth/seventh decile and a decreasing positive e⁄ect thereafter (Table V).
It can be concluded that having extra insurance through health subsystems is important to
determine whether or not to visit a doctor and is slightly less relevant in explaining further
visits to a doctor. Moreover, the similarities between the patterns of both subsystems are
clear when we compute the ratio between them across quantiles, since it remains almost
unchanged. In fact, the e⁄ect of private subsystem insurance plans is between 2:6 and
2:9 times higher than the impact of the public employees￿insurance plans. This result
shows that health insurance double coverage does lead to further use of health care and
its public/private nature is also quite important, as private subsystems double coverage
induces much more consumption than public subsystems double coverage. This evidence
may be related to some di⁄erences between subsystems regarding the reimbursing policy.
Overall, the positive e⁄ect of double coverage is consistent with the results obtained for the
expected number of visits using the traditional parametric models. (see B1 of Appendix
36B). We tested the exogeneity of the double coverage variables with the construction of
a sub-sample that potentially includes only indirect bene￿ciaries of public subsystems
(spouses and descendants), by considering population covered by public health subsystems
that do not work in general government. The results are presented and discussed in
Appendix E.
To better understand the e⁄ect of health subsystems on health care utilisation we
used the point estimates to predict the y￿￿ quantile (note that here we consider the
relevant outcome) for each observation in a simulation exercise in which all variables are
set equal to their actual values, except the health insurance status. The latter assumes
three distinct possible outcomes: only NHS, NHS plus a public subsystem and NHS plus
a private subsystem. Results measured by relative frequencies are presented in Table VI.
Table VI: Frequencies of estimated quantiles for the number of visits to a doctor
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 > 10
NHS
_
Qy(0:25jx) 89:4 8:3 1:4 0:4 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0
_
Qy(0:50jx) 58:2 32:8 5:5 1:7 0:7 0:4 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:2
_
Qy(0:75jx) 1:3 69:3 17:9 5:6 2:5 1:1 0:7 0:5 0:2 0:2 0:7
_
Qy(0:90jx) 0:0 23:4 46:3 15:1 6:2 3:1 1:8 1:1 0:7 0:5 1:8
Public subsystem
_
Qy(0:25jx) 87:9 9:4 1:6 0:5 0:3 0:1 0:1 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0
_
Qy(0:50jx) 54:0 35:7 6:3 2:0 0:9 0:5 0:2 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:2
_
Qy(0:75jx) 0:7 65:7 20:1 6:5 2:9 1:4 0:8 0:5 0:3 0:2 0:8
_
Qy(0:90jx) 0:0 19:5 47:2 16:6 6:7 3:5 1:9 1:2 0:8 0:6 2:0
Private subsystem
_
Qy(0:25jx) 83:6 12:3 2:4 0:8 0:3 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
_
Qy(0:50jx) 46:8 40:3 7:5 2:6 1:2 0:6 0:3 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:3
_
Qy(0:75jx) 0:2 60:0 23:4 7:6 3:6 1:8 0:9 0:7 0:5 0:3 1:0
_
Qy(0:90jx) 0:0 13:2 47:7 19:5 7:7 4:0 2:3 1:5 1:0 0:7 2:4
Notes: Estimates are based on a simulation exercise that start by predicting the y￿
￿￿ quantile
for all 35,308 individuals setting all control variables in their actual values except the health
insurance status, which is set in the three possible cases. After that, the y￿￿ quantiles are
computed applying Qy(￿jx) =dQy￿(￿jx) ￿ 1e and tabulated according to their frequen-
cies.
Given that half of the sample has zero visits, it is not surprising that the ￿rst con-
ditional quartile is zero for almost all observations. When the estimates from di⁄erent
quantiles are compared, we have the perception that the distribution changes di⁄erently
37across the health insurance plans. For instance, the proportion of individuals with a pre-
dicted quantile of zero or one consultation is always lower with double coverage, but these
relative e⁄ects change between quantiles. In particular, when covered solely by NHS, the
proportion is 91:0, 70:7 and 23:4 per cent for the 0:50y￿, 0:75y￿, 0:90y￿quantile, respec-
tively, while with a private subsystem on top of the NHS the proportion is 87:1, 60:2 and
13:2 per cent for the 0:50y￿, 0:75y￿, 0:90y￿quantile, respectively. This means that be-
ing double covered causes a decreasing path in the di⁄erence of proportion of individuals
with a certain (increasing) number of visits that is steeper from the 0:50y￿quantile to
the 0:75y￿quantile than from the 0:75y￿quantile to the 0:90y￿quantile.
Regarding the e⁄ects of health status variables as a whole, it is visible that most of the
regressors have a positive e⁄ect that increases with ￿, which means that the distribution of
the number of doctor consultations for individuals that are sicker is displaced upwards and
more spread-out. As expected, having an episode of illness, seems especially important
to determine whether or not the individual visits a doctor and, taking into consideration
the results of the last decile, it is even more important in explaining the subsequent
visits. This last ￿nding is in accordance with the results derived from the two-part
models (Table B2 and B3 of Appendix B). The e⁄ect of long term incapacity becomes
gradually more relevant, as for the ￿rst quantiles it is not signi￿cant and for higher levels
of consumption it has a very important impact. Amongst the chronic diseases we found
evidence of a positive increasing e⁄ect along the estimated quantiles, except for the dummy
"osteoporosis" that has a decreasing impact, and for "infarction", "otherchronicaldisease",
"highbloodpressure", "diabetes" and "asthma" that have a constant e⁄ect in the di⁄erent
parts of the distribution. When compared with the parametric models, we conclude that
the signs of the coe¢ cients are equal and the magnitude of the relative e⁄ects between
variables present minor di⁄erences. The proxy for the level of exposure to stress has
an e⁄ect that does not vary much across quantiles, and the other regressors related to
attitudes towards health care have decreasing e⁄ects. The negative and decreasing impact
of being a smoker contrasts with the results of Louren￿o (2007), which although using a
slightly di⁄erent variable found positive e⁄ects on the consumption of visits to a doctor.
Another interesting result is that having the habit of eating several times a day has also a
positive impact. These results show that individuals that take better care of their health
by not smoking and having a higher number of meals also complement their care by being
38more pro-active in visiting a doctor. These attitudes towards health care seem to more
than o⁄set the impact of the improved health stemming from non-smoking and having
a higher number of meals. The comparison between these ￿ndings and the ones derived
from the two-part models validates this conclusion. When we study the impact of being
a smoker on the decision to visit or not to visit the doctor we found a positive impact,
which means that the probability of having zero visits is higher for the smoker than
for the non-smoker. Regarding the second part of the model (the choice on the number
of consultations), we found that in similar conditions a smoker decides, on average, to
consume more doctor visits than a non-smoker (the sign is positive, although not always
signi￿cant).
Socioeconomic characteristics seem to have a similar impact across quantiles. Con-
cerning the household size e⁄ect, the results indicate that an individual consumes on
average less consultations if the number of members of his/her household is larger. These
￿ndings are in accordance with the ones found in Winkelmann (2006). A possible eco-
nomic explanation for this e⁄ect is the presence of "economies of experience" within the
family due to the fact that decisions taken by more than one person bene￿t from more
in-depth information, which on its turn in￿ uence health status and e¢ ciency in producing
healthy times. It is also plausible that scale economies play a role if it is true that when
visiting a doctor patients often also ask for symptoms of diseases of their relatives in order
to prevent further visits.
Regarding the e⁄ect of age, from Figure 1 we see that the utilisation of health care is
very high in the ￿rst years of life and decreases until 30￿40 years old, more for men than
for women, and thereafter it increases for men while remaining fairly constant for women.
These results seem intuitive and are consistent with the literature: the initial decreasing
path may be related to the fact that children often require more health care (having there-
fore periodic doctor appointments); and after some point in the life cycle it is expected an
increasing use of health services both if we consider that age is a health status proxy or
a indicator of the depreciation rate (Grossman 1972). Most of the applications studying
health care demand consider that age has a quadratic relationship with the utilisation of
medical services (Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995, Winkelmann 2006 and Louren￿o 2007). We
tried to introduce the quadratic relation in our speci￿cation, but both coe¢ cients did not
appear signi￿cant and we found that a third order polynomial allows a much better ￿t
39to the data. Additionally, we modelled the ageing and gender e⁄ects together. Note that
in our speci￿cation, it makes little sense to interpret the dummy "female" alone. The
advantages of assessing the ageing e⁄ect by gender type are clear from Figure 1: men
tend to consume less while women￿ s behaviour towards health demand is smoother over
the life cycle. Comparing the e⁄ects of age on the median to the ones on the 0:80y￿
quantile, we observe that the pattern of the e⁄ects is similar, but the impact of age is less
pronounced in explaining high levels of visits to a doctor. This last result is very much
in line with Winkelmann (2006) that shows that age in the upper tail of the distribution
of the number of visits has an insigni￿cant e⁄ect.
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the set of covariates equal e x except for age that is variable.
The level of income has a positive but negligible e⁄ect on the utilisation of health care,
constant across the di⁄erent quantiles. Conceptually, it is possible to ￿nd at least two
channels of income in￿ uences. The ￿rst is derived from the Grossman￿ s model (1972), in
which the income determines the budget constraint and, therefore, the ability to pay for
health care. The second channel is related to the fact that di⁄erent levels of income can
explain di⁄erences in the opportunity cost of being ill and in the cost of visiting the doctor,
especially if we closely relate income with the wage rate. In Portugal, the ￿rst channel
may not be important because of the features of its health care system. This is broadly
applicable to both private and public subsystems and to NHS bene￿ciaries, although to the
latter in a minor extent. Direct costs of bene￿ciaries are relatively small as most of the cost
of a consultation is borne by the health care system, which is ￿nanced predominantly by
40general taxation or by employers and employees compulsory contributions. In this context,
the second channel can be more relevant and it is consistent with the estimated small e⁄ect
of income over all the outcome distribution. Also the educational level has a small positive
impact that does not change signi￿cantly across the estimated quantiles. This appears
to indicate that individuals with high educational levels face a higher opportunity cost of
being ill and this more than o⁄set the opportunity cost of visiting the doctor. Moreover,
there is no evidence supporting the idea that more educated people are able to improve
health more e¢ ciently generating fewer doctors￿consultations. The previous empirical
evidence of Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Winkelmann (2006) and Louren￿o (2007) also
found small positive e⁄ects for both income and education variables.
Concerning the e⁄ect of marital status, results point out that single people visit doctors
less often. These ￿ndings may indicate that they are less risk-averse regarding their
health. As to the occupational status, the estimated semi-elasticities are positive for
retired individuals and negative for students, meaning that the utilisation of health care
increases over the life cycle, being lower when we study, higher when we work and much
higher when we retire. In the interpretation of the results we should be aware that
these particular variables may capture to some extent Grossman￿ s income and age e⁄ects:
traditionally, students are the youngest in the database and retirees the oldest.
Finally, the coe¢ cients related with the area of residence indicate that individuals
from "Centro" utilise more consultations, followed by "Norte" and "Lisboa". Individuals
from the autonomous regions consume much less health care services than the ones from
mainland. Regarding the estimated e⁄ects in the di⁄erent quantiles, we conclude that
they are more or less constant for most of the cases and growing in the case of "Norte"
and "Lisboa". The seasonality variables indicate that individuals consume less visits to
doctors in the summer while in the autumn their doctor￿ s consultations reach a peak.
5.3 Further results: cumulative health e⁄ects of double coverage
As mentioned in Section 4.3, some individuals may have enjoyed health insurance double
coverage for a long period of time which may generate cumulative health bene￿ts from a
hypothetical better medical follow-up accumulated over time. If this occurs, the di⁄erence
in the number of consultations between the "treated" and "control" groups could decrease
41with age. The idea is that recent bene￿ciaries of a health subsystem (more likely the
younger generations) did not have time to accumulate such health bene￿ts, whereas the
older bene￿ciaries (more likely the older generations) had time to do so, and that will make
them relatively healthier when compared with "untreated" individuals. If this behaviour
is not fully controlled by the health status variables, the estimated double coverage e⁄ect
can be positively biased. Following Barros et al. (2008), we estimate our speci￿cation
in di⁄erent age groups, within the quantile regression framework. To do that we worked
with three subsamples: individuals with more than 18 years old, a younger cohort with
people between 18 to 45 years old and a older cohort with people between 45 to 80 years
old. Table VII presents the double coverage coe¢ cients (and standard errors).














pubsub 0:070 0:081 0:084 0:077 0:054 0:032
(0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
privsub 0:174 0:213 0:224 0:198 0:140 0:103
(0.071) (0.060) (0.057) (0.050) (0.045) (0.054)
18 ￿ age ￿ 45 (N= 12637)
pubsub 0:220 0:209 0:193 0:177 0:114 0:029
(0.060) (0.056) (0.054) (0.056) (0.051) (0.046)
privsub 0:176 0:284 0:345 0:384 0:300 0:255
(0.137) (0.129) (0.123) (0.119) (0.093) (0.111)
45 ￿ age ￿ 80 (N=16637)
pubsub 0:002 0:031 0:034 0:036 0:048 0:042
(0.044) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
privsub 0:193 0:213 0:184 0:152 0:091 0:022
(0.077) (0.065) (0.058) (0.050) (0.044) (0.058)
Notes: "N" means the number of observations in each subsample. Values in brackets correspond
to the standard errors. Results for other variables can be found from Table C3 to Table C8 in
Appendix C.
The most important fact is that the e⁄ects of both public and private subsystems
are higher for the younger generations and this occurs in the whole distribution. When
we restrict the analysis to individuals with more than eighteen years old, thus rising the
average age, both insurance coe¢ cients decrease (slightly more in the upper tail of the
distribution), whereas the younger cohort (individuals with more than eighteen and less
42than forty ￿ve) has the largest estimated treatment e⁄ects. The di⁄erences are very
expressive, especially for public employees. This is consistent with Barros et al. (2008)
￿ndings. For di⁄erent levels of visits to a doctor, bene￿ciaries from private subsystems
and public subsystems now behave in a di⁄erent way. Regarding the public subsystems,
quantile regression results show that the e⁄ect of supplementary insurance of the younger
cohort decreases considerably across the distribution, which is points to a double coverage
impact relatively lower among young high users. Note that this is clearly more marked
than the ￿ndings resulting from the full sample. For the private subsystem, the estimated
impact of the younger group increases until the 0:70y￿- quantile and decreases thereafter.
This path is similar to that one obtained for the full sample. The results seem to con￿rm
the suspicion that the estimated e⁄ects for the elder groups are lower, possibly re￿ ecting
accumulated health bene￿ts from the existence of the subsystems.34 In this context the
best indicator of moral hazard would be one obtained from the sample of individuals that
possibly did not have time to incorporate such bene￿ts. The caveat is the reduction of
the sample, in particular of the "treated" individuals.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyses the impact of additional coverage on the utilisation of doctor con-
sultations at di⁄erent levels of the outcome distribution, contributing to the empirical
literature on moral hazard and equity in the health care sector. Using a recent quan-
tile regression method for count data, we overcome a limitation of traditional parametric
count data models by investigating the e⁄ect of supplementary insurance on the whole
outcome distribution without imposing restrictive assumptions. The application to the
Portuguese case, allows us to discard the selection bias problem by using only individuals
who bene￿t from health insurance double coverage (through subsystems) on a mandatory
basis and by analysing its impact in di⁄erent age cohorts.
Our results show that the additional insurance is very important in explaining the
utilisation of doctor visits in all levels of usage, being slightly higher for medium-intensity
users. That is, double coverage leads to a relatively higher increase in the utilisation of
34The ￿nal report of a commission that recently assessed the sustainability of the NHS funding con-
cluded, however, that there is no evidence that the additional consumption of health care services have
impact on the self-assessment of health status.
43visits to a doctor for regular users of the health system vis-￿-vis heavy users. When the
e⁄ects of public and private health insurance plans are compared it seems that double
coverage derived from private health insurance is much higher than the one derived from
the health insurance plan of public employees. The analysis for the youngest cohort
shows that the estimated e⁄ects of both public and private health insurance on top of the
NHS are higher than the ones for the full sample, possibly re￿ ecting accumulated health
bene￿ts.
To explain the di⁄erences in the utilisation of health care between the di⁄erent health
insurance status we control for several demographic, socioeconomic and health status
variables, as well as geographic and seasonal e⁄ects. Not surprisingly, results indicate that
the existence of chronic disease or pain is extremely relevant in explaining doctor visits,
especially for high users. Among the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, age
(also as proxy of health status) assumes a unique role, especially when combined with
gender. In the ￿rst years of living the consumption of health care is very high and it
decreases until 30-40 years old, more for men than for women, and thereafter it increases
for men and remains fairly constant for women. Education and income present signi￿cant
positive e⁄ects (constant over the whole distribution) although less important than those
of other regressors. Results from quantile regression are similar to those from previous
literature in terms of the signi￿cance of key covariates, but the combination of age and
gender is novel in the literature.
In short, health insurance double coverage generates additional utilisation of health
care. This additional consumption e⁄ect is probably only slightly higher for medium-
intensity users than for heavy users. Another interesting piece of evidence is the large
di⁄erence in impact according to the type of health insurance double coverage. The
second layer of health insurance coverage adds more to utilisation when provided by
private organizations than when obtained from government ￿nanced entities.
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pB Results from preliminary model
Table B1: Results from single-crossing models
Poisson
pseudo-ml Negbin I Negbin II Poisson
log-normal
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.056y (0.024) 0.061 (0.020) 0.061y (0.025) 0.067 (0.022)
privsub 0.150 (0.043) 0.159 (0.037) 0.168 (0.044) 0.187 (0.044)
Health status variables
sick 0.538 (0.079) 0.501 (0.067) 0.627 (0.081) 0.611 (0.067)
limitdays 0.056 (0.003) 0.052 (0.002) 0.068 (0.003) 0.066 (0.002)
limited 0.272 (0.082) 0.181 (0.059) 0.329 (0.089) 0.259 (0.058)
rheumatism 0.089 (0.023) 0.101 (0.018) 0.101 (0.022) 0.120 (0.020)
osteoporosis 0.120 (0.029) 0.136 (0.022) 0.154 (0.032) 0.163 (0.027)
cancer 0.440 (0.056) 0.354 (0.043) 0.515 (0.059) 0.455 (0.043)
kidneystones 0.123 (0.032) 0.124 (0.027) 0.161 (0.031) 0.168 (0.030)
renalfailure 0.256 (0.079) 0.139 (0.052) 0.393 (0.097) 0.240 (0.051)
emphysema 0.121 (0.040) 0.107 (0.034) 0.176 (0.040) 0.166 (0.037)
cerebralhemorrhage 0.124y (0.051) 0.122 (0.041) 0.128 (0.048) 0.137 (0.047)
infarction 0.126y (0.051) 0.180 (0.046) 0.179 (0.047) 0.226 (0.053)
depressivedisorder 0.168 (0.028) 0.160 (0.023) 0.212 (0.029) 0.213 (0.026)
otherchronicaldisease 0.326 (0.019) 0.315 (0.015) 0.364 (0.019) 0.366 (0.016)
highbloodpressure 0.214 (0.022) 0.232 (0.017) 0.249 (0.022) 0.265 (0.019)
chronicpain 0.158 (0.023) 0.145 (0.018) 0.201 (0.023) 0.196 (0.020)
diabetes 0.270 (0.029) 0.259 (0.021) 0.314 (0.029) 0.309 (0.025)
asthma 0.243 (0.035) 0.224 (0.027) 0.275 (0.038) 0.263 (0.030)
stress 0.279 (0.026) 0.273 (0.020) 0.305 (0.026) 0.310 (0.022)
smoker -0.039z (0.033) -0.099 (0.023) -0.041z (0.032) -0.077 (0.024)
meals 0.089y (0.036) 0.096 (0.028) 0.099 (0.036) 0.104 (0.030)
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.023 (0.009) -0.035 (0.006) -0.031 (0.009) -0.035 (0.006)
age -0.753 (0.072) -0.729 (0.050) -0.752 (0.069) -0.739 (0.054)
age2 0.166 (0.019) 0.160 (0.014) 0.163 (0.019) 0.160 (0.015)
age3 -0.010 (0.001) -0.010 (0.001) -0.010 (0.001) -0.010 (0.001)
age*female 0.489 (0.098) 0.460 (0.069) 0.459 (0.095) 0.454 (0.074)
(age*female)2 -0.113 (0.026) -0.104 (0.019) -0.107 (0.026) -0.104 (0.020)
(age*female)3 0.007 (0.002) 0.006 (0.001) 0.007 (0.002) 0.006 (0.002)
female -0.252y (0.103) -0.240 (0.067) -0.224y (0.099) -0.219 (0.072)
educmax 0.004z (0.002) 0.007 (0.002) 0.006y (0.002) 0.007y (0.002)
lincome 0.012z (0.018) 0.029y (0.013) 0.025z (0.018) 0.034 (0.014)
single -0.142 (0.035) -0.147 (0.027) -0.150 (0.033) -0.150 (0.028)
student -0.205 (0.040) -0.194 (0.028) -0.185 (0.039) -0.194 (0.030)
retired 0.147 (0.028) 0.120 (0.021) 0.160 (0.029) 0.147 (0.025)
Geographic variables
Norte -0.110 (0.028) -0.075 (0.023) -0.090 (0.028) -0.080 (0.026)
Lisboa -0.108 (0.029) -0.087 (0.023) -0.100 (0.029) -0.094 (0.027)
Alentejo -0.173 (0.029) -0.167 (0.024) -0.176 (0.030) -0.179 (0.027)
Algarve -0.127 (0.032) -0.147 (0.024) -0.140 (0.032) -0.159 (0.027)
A￿ores -0.306 (0.034) -0.298 (0.025) -0.302 (0.034) -0.331 (0.028)
Madeira -0.378 (0.040) -0.412 (0.027) -0.396 (0.040) -0.448 (0.000)
Seasonality variables
winter 0.125 (0.024) 0.120 (0.019) 0.145 (0.024) 0.143 (0.021)
spring 0.079 (0.025) 0.069 (0.019) 0.079 (0.024) 0.077 (0.021)
summer 0.036z (0.025) 0.024z (0.019) 0.036z (0.026) 0.026z (0.022)
Constant 0.303y (0.145) 0.193z (0.104) 0.165z (0.139) -0.217y (0.111)
￿ 0.790 (0.031) 0.662 (0.025) 0.768 (0.008)
Notes: Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not signi￿cative at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. The S.E.
for Poisson, NegBinI and NegBin II are robust standard errors. Coe¢ cient ￿ is the dispersion parameter (for
the Negbin I, the V ar(yjx) = ￿ + ￿; and for the Negbin II, the V ar(yjx) = ￿(1 + ￿)) and if is
equal 0 corresponds to dispersion equal one, and it is simply a Poisson.
iiTable B2: Results from Hurdle count data models
Poisson Hurdle model Pr(y = 0) E(yjy > 0)
Pr(y = 0) E(yjy > 0) Logit Probit ZT NegBin I and II
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Health insurance status variables
pubsub -0.068 (0.024) 0.039z (0.034) -0.094 -0.059 0.096z 0.044z
privsub -0.209 (0.054) 0.101z (0.057) -0.287 -0.176 0.231y 0.138z
Health status variables
sick -1.054 (0.215) 0.423 (0.079) -1.338 -0.782 0.558 0.637
limitdays -0.149 (0.010) 0.045 (0.003) -0.168 -0.087 0.064 0.068
limited -0.046z (0.081) 0.284 (0.097) -0.069z -0.039z 0.357 0.443
rheumatism -0.160 (0.030) 0.073y (0.029) -0.190 -0.110 0.176 0.115
osteoporosis -0.427 (0.051) 0.056z (0.036) -0.520 -0.296 0.110y 0.106y
cancer -0.666 (0.093) 0.407 (0.062) -0.809 -0.456 0.470 0.580
kidneystones -0.207 (0.049) 0.114 (0.037) -0.253 -0.147 0.164 0.207
renalfailure -0.421 (0.113) 0.298 (0.087) -0.490 -0.263 0.106z 0.587
emphysema -0.229 (0.059) 0.141 (0.046) -0.265 -0.137 0.184y 0.244
cerebralhemorrhage -0.245 (0.092) 0.121y (0.061) -0.269y -0.138y 0.199y 0.168y
infarction -0.526 (0.109) 0.076z (0.055) -0.622 -0.333 0.222y 0.135z
depressivedisorder -0.285 (0.045) 0.161 (0.033) -0.333 -0.186 0.268 0.251
otherchronicaldisease -0.422 (0.019) 0.209 (0.026) -0.569 -0.340 0.380 0.290
highbloodpressure -0.435 (0.027) 0.082 (0.029) -0.563 -0.333 0.160 0.121
chronicpain -0.233 (0.030) 0.136 (0.029) -0.293 -0.172 0.212 0.233
diabetes -0.600 (0.045) 0.158 (0.036) -0.760 -0.441 0.201 0.225
asthma -0.324 (0.042) 0.189 (0.043) -0.435 -0.255 0.335 0.222
stress -0.568 (0.040) 0.178 (0.032) -0.706 -0.410 0.293 0.245
smoker 0.111 (0.022) 0.089z (0.047) 0.192 0.116 0.041z 0.124y
meals -0.126 (0.031) 0.015z (0.049) -0.224 -0.131 0.012z 0.020z
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize 0.041 (0.006) 0.016z (0.013) 0.068 0.041 0.014z 0.004z
age 0.631 (0.053) -0.351 (0.112) 1.000 0.618 -0.826 -0.416
age2 -0.126 (0.015) 0.072y (0.029) -0.204 -0.127 0.191 0.079y
age3 0.007 (0.001) -0.004y (0.002) 0.012 0.008 -0.012y -0.005z
age*female -0.293 (0.076) 0.279z (0.148) -0.483 -0.299 1.020 0.300y
(age*female)2 0.062 (0.022) -0.065z (0.038) 0.105 0.064 -0.243 -0.071y
(age*female)3 -0.004y (0.002) 0.004z (0.003) -0.006y -0.004y 0.015y 0.004z
female 0.162y (0.072) -0.129z (0.161) 0.256y 0.163y -0.606z -0.106z
educmax -0.013 (0.002) -0.006z (0.003) -0.018 -0.011 -0.008z -0.006z
lincome -0.075 (0.015) -0.033z (0.025) -0.102 -0.061 -0.036z -0.033z
single 0.141 (0.027) -0.070z (0.051) 0.219 0.134 -0.206y -0.096z
student 0.151 (0.026) -0.135y (0.067) 0.230 0.145 -0.897 -0.135y
retired -0.191 (0.035) 0.126 (0.037) -0.251 -0.148 0.184 0.175
Geographic variables
Norte 0.017z (0.031) -0.152 (0.038) 0.028z 0.019y -0.293 -0.174
Lisboa 0.015z (0.032) -0.127 (0.039) 0.036z 0.024y -0.241 -0.162
Alentejo 0.183 (0.031) -0.113 (0.038) 0.276 0.169 -0.220 -0.137
Algarve 0.182 (0.030) -0.037z (0.043) 0.271 0.166 -0.097z -0.057z
A￿ores 0.240 (0.030) -0.259 (0.051) 0.361 0.222 -0.724 -0.318
Madeira 0.402 (0.030) -0.202 (0.062) 0.584 0.362 -0.628 -0.238
Seasonality variables
winter -0.138 (0.022) 0.084y (0.034) -0.199 -0.120 0.155 0.130
spring -0.072 (0.022) 0.062z (0.035) -0.111 -0.066 0.111y 0.065y
summer -0.035z (0.022) 0.027z (0.036) -0.055z -0.032z 0.015z 0.020z
Constant -0.198z (0.117) 0.718 (0.210) 0.115z 0.037z 0.143z -0.159z
￿ 1.309 2.181
Notes: Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not signi￿cative at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. The S.E.
are robust standard error.
iiiTable B3: Results from Zero-In￿ ated count data models
Zero-in￿ ated Poisson Zero-in￿ ated Negbin II
y In￿ ated y In￿ ated
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E
Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.036z (0.030) -0.121z (0.076) 0.038z (0.028) -0.195z (0.117)
privsub 0.094z (0.051) -0.384y (0.170) 0.109y (0.047) -0.745y (0.322)
Health status variables
sick 0.455 (0.074) -1.923y (1.016) 0.541 (0.072) -35.821 (1.919)
limitdays 0.044 (0.003) -15.416 (1.588) 0.058 (0.003) -35.596 (0.234)
limited 0.202y (0.092) 0.148z (0.24) 0.229 (0.089) 0.357z (0.477)
rheumatism 0.063y (0.025) -0.398 (0.115) 0.081 (0.022) -1.281 (0.338)
osteoporosis 0.089 (0.031) -1.235 (0.285) 0.146 (0.029) -2.513y (1.090)
cancer 0.377 (0.060) -1.150 (0.424) 0.442 (0.054) -38.326 (0.622)
kidneystones 0.116 (0.034) -0.299z (0.175) 0.147 (0.030) -0.962y (0.477)
renalfailure 0.281 (0.082) -0.827z (0.531) 0.361 (0.086) -37.050 (0.631)
emphysema 0.110 (0.043) -0.519y (0.206) 0.146 (0.04) -1.302 (0.454)
cerebralhemorrhage 0.101z (0.055) -0.825y (0.408) 0.119y (0.048) -2.089z (1.431)
infarction 0.085z (0.049) -1.945 (0.73) 0.159 (0.044) -16.444 (4.085)
depressivedisorder 0.135 (0.030) -0.658 (0.197) 0.169 (0.027) -13.955 (2.893)
otherchronicaldisease 0.167 (0.022) -0.841 (0.071) 0.203 (0.020) -1.799 (0.175)
highbloodpressure 0.084 (0.026) -1.084 (0.125) 0.152 (0.022) -3.086 (0.904)
chronicpain 0.124 (0.026) -0.395 (0.109) 0.151 (0.023) -1.407 (0.325)
diabetes 0.179 (0.031) -1.331 (0.202) 0.247 (0.029) -2.849 (1.043)
asthma 0.160 (0.040) -0.602 (0.137) 0.169 (0.038) -1.310 (0.302)
stress 0.202 (0.028) -1.194 (0.189) 0.269 (0.024) -20.554 (0.901)
smoker 0.039z (0.044) 0.296 (0.080) -0.005z (0.038) 0.229z (0.117)
meals 0.072z (0.045) -0.122z (0.112) 0.113 (0.039) 0.106z (0.166)
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize 0.007z (0.011) 0.091 (0.019) -0.005z (0.010) 0.109 (0.026)
age -0.338 (0.097) 1.045 (0.175) -0.429 (0.090) 1.414 (0.270)
age2 0.063y (0.026) -0.225 (0.050) 0.082 (0.024) -0.293 (0.080)
age3 -0.004z (0.002) 0.014 (0.004) -0.005 (0.002) 0.018 (0.007)
age*female 0.240z (0.124) -0.436z (0.234) 0.238y (0.113) -0.670z (0.349)
(age*female)2 -0.053z (0.032) 0.113z (0.070) -0.052z (0.030) 0.163z (0.108)
(age*female)3 0.003z (0.002) -0.009z (0.006) 0.003z (0.002) -0.013z (0.010)
female -0.118z (0.133) 0.202z (0.220) -0.100z (0.122) 0.385z (0.321)
educmax -0.006y (0.003) -0.045 (0.007) -0.004z (0.003) -0.077 (0.012)
lincome -0.022z (0.022) -0.212 (0.050) -0.001z (0.019) -0.270 (0.074)
single -0.085z (0.045) 0.201y (0.089) -0.088y (0.039) 0.362 (0.127)
student -0.115y (0.057) 0.189y (0.090) -0.098z (0.052) 0.310y (0.129)
retired 0.124 (0.031) -0.286y (0.123) 0.155 (0.028) -0.253z (0.248)
Geographic variables
Norte -0.141 (0.033) -0.168z (0.094) -0.109 (0.03) -0.141z (0.164)
Lisboa -0.124 (0.034) -0.227y (0.100) -0.109 (0.031) -0.311z (0.180)
Alentejo -0.135 (0.034) 0.181y (0.092) -0.143 (0.032) 0.324y (0.160)
Algarve -0.059z (0.039) 0.283 (0.091) -0.074y (0.035) 0.479 (0.154)
A￿ores -0.247 (0.043) 0.189y (0.095) -0.236 (0.038) 0.438 (0.154)
Madeira -0.168 (0.052) 0.643 (0.094) -0.159 (0.048) 1.233 (0.160)
Seasonality variables
winter 0.064y (0.029) -0.257 (0.070) 0.087 (0.027) -0.420 (0.108)
spring 0.060y (0.030) -0.089z (0.069) 0.063y (0.027) -0.139z (0.102)
summer 0.027z (0.031) -0.053z (0.070) 0.021z (0.028) -0.106z (0.105)
Constant 0.699 (0.179) 0.444z (0.369) 0.360y (0.158) -0.365z (0.560)
￿ 0.491 (0.046)
Notes: Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not signi￿cative at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. The S.E.
are robust standard error. The in￿ated distribution is a probit in the ￿st model and a logit in the second.
ivTable B4: Results from Zero-In￿ ated count data models
parameters log-likelihood BIC AIC CAIC
One-part models
Poisson pseudo-ml 44 -49,123 98,706 49,211 98,750
Negbin I 45 -45,122 90,715 45,212 90,760
Negbin II 45 -45,274 91,020 45,364 91,065
Poisson log-normal 45 -44,586 89,643 44,676 89,688
Hurdle models
Poisson Hurdle 88 -47,100 95,122 47,276 95,210
Logit-Negbin I 89 -44,314 89,559 44,492 89,648
Probit-Negbin II 89 -44,238 89,408 44,416 89,497
Zero-in￿ ated models
Zero-in￿ ated Poisson 88 -47,010 94,942 47,186 95,030
Zero-in￿ ated Negbin II 89 -44,565 90,062 44,743 90,151
Note: The BIC, AIC and CAIC are popular measures for comparing maximum likelihood
models.
vC Results from quantile regression













Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.025
privsub 0.070 0.055 0.053 0.051 0.046 0.053
Health status variables
sick 0.097 0.095 0.081 0.106 0.120 0.097
limitdays 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
limited 0.094 0.081 0.080 0.078 0.077 0.073
rheumatism 0.032 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024
osteoporosis 0.039 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.032
cancer 0.065 0.050 0.042 0.047 0.056 0.068
kidneystones 0.045 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.038
renalfailure 0.075 0.069 0.064 0.065 0.059 0.067
emphysema 0.060 0.049 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.050
cerebralhemorrhage 0.076 0.055 0.054 0.061 0.051 0.062
infarction 0.079 0.063 0.063 0.053 0.050 0.065
depressivedisorder 0.042 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.034
otherchronicaldisease 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.019
highbloodpressure 0.030 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.022
chronicpain 0.031 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.024
diabetes 0.037 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.030
asthma 0.047 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.037
stress 0.035 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025
smoker 0.035 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.028
meals 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.036
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007
age 0.080 0.067 0.066 0.071 0.063 0.059
age2 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.017
age3 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
age*female 0.112 0.095 0.093 0.092 0.082 0.085
(age*female)2 0.031 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.023
(age*female)3 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
female 0.109 0.092 0.089 0.083 0.074 0.085
educmax 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
lincome 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.017
single 0.041 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.034 0.034
student 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.034 0.034
retired 0.037 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.027
Geographic variables
Norte 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.030
Lisboa 0.040 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.033
Alentejo 0.039 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.033
Algarve 0.039 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.029 0.032
A￿ores 0.039 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.031
Madeira 0.042 0.037 0.036 0.039 0.036 0.033
Seasonality variables
winter 0.031 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.024
spring 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.023
summer 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.025
Constant 0.166 0.144 0.143 0.141 0.121 0.130
viTable C2: Quantile regression results: marginal e⁄ects
ME(0.25) ME(0.50) ME(0.60) ME(0.70) ME(0.80) ME(0.90)
Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.012 0.027 0.037 0.051 0.059 0.069
privsub 0.033 0.075 0.104 0.130 0.158 0.194
Health status variables
sick 0.147 0.240 0.298 0.412 0.567 1.412
limitdays 0.011 0.022 0.029 0.038 0.057 0.092
limited 0.022 0.066 0.104 0.189 0.310 0.540
rheumatism 0.022 0.044 0.055 0.075 0.124 0.196
osteoporosis 0.049 0.067 0.074 0.082 0.095 0.116
cancer 0.090 0.172 0.199 0.235 0.386 0.839
kidneystones 0.024 0.048 0.071 0.104 0.192 0.285
renalfailure 0.027 0.072 0.088 0.127 0.231 0.320
emphysema 0.014 0.068 0.092 0.127 0.203 0.326
cerebralhemorrhage 0.021 0.042 0.053 0.089 0.163 0.253
infarction 0.052 0.112 0.152 0.203 0.262 0.293
depressivedisorder 0.031 0.076 0.104 0.144 0.216 0.341
otherchronicaldisease 0.082 0.166 0.223 0.291 0.364 0.512
highbloodpressure 0.076 0.135 0.164 0.190 0.231 0.280
chronicpain 0.028 0.063 0.091 0.129 0.192 0.305
diabetes 0.086 0.129 0.150 0.186 0.264 0.411
asthma 0.051 0.112 0.150 0.202 0.246 0.314
stress 0.084 0.126 0.151 0.178 0.264 0.344
smoker -0.028 -0.047 -0.057 -0.071 -0.070 -0.040
meals 0.031 0.050 0.051 0.060 0.066 0.088
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.010 -0.017 -0.022 -0.030 -0.030 -0.021
age when male 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.007
age when female 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
female 0.074 0.141 0.194 0.292 0.308 0.402
educmax 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007
lincome 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006
single -0.030 -0.052 -0.068 -0.098 -0.118 -0.133
student -0.034 -0.064 -0.088 -0.112 -0.128 -0.192
retired 0.028 0.047 0.053 0.061 0.099 0.186
Geographic variables
Norte -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 -0.021 -0.042 -0.110
Lisboa -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.041 -0.068 -0.121
Alentejo -0.036 -0.058 -0.073 -0.088 -0.113 -0.161
Algarve -0.033 -0.054 -0.066 -0.077 -0.105 -0.185
A￿ores -0.047 -0.085 -0.113 -0.159 -0.223 -0.360
Madeira -0.063 -0.117 -0.159 -0.229 -0.314 -0.465
Seasonality variables
winter 0.028 0.055 0.072 0.094 0.114 0.191
spring 0.015 0.028 0.039 0.048 0.057 0.086
summer 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.000 -0.016 -0.003
Notes: Marginal e⁄ects marked with * or ** were multiplied by 10 or 100, respectively.













Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.070y 0.081 0.084 0.077 0.054y 0.032z
privsub 0.174y 0.213 0.224 0.198 0.140 0.103z
Health status variables
sick 0.746 0.664 0.648 0.625 0.582 0.805
limitdays 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.066
limited 0.165z 0.234 0.271 0.334 0.352 0.379
rheumatism 0.141 0.150 0.149 0.145 0.149 0.148
osteoporosis 0.294 0.222 0.198 0.166 0.128 0.104
cancer 0.461 0.454 0.424 0.375 0.382 0.494
kidneystones 0.159 0.168 0.187 0.201 0.228 0.214
renalfailure 0.151y 0.193 0.197 0.198 0.238 0.215
emphysema 0.052z 0.152 0.169 0.165 0.184 0.213
cerebralhemorrhage 0.135z 0.136 0.128y 0.143y 0.191 0.195
infarction 0.303 0.347 0.347 0.342 0.297 0.209
depressivedisorder 0.201 0.241 0.256 0.253 0.249 0.234
otherchronicaldisease 0.379 0.393 0.407 0.391 0.340 0.320
highbloodpressure 0.417 0.390 0.372 0.321 0.259 0.209
chronicpain 0.175 0.198 0.221 0.223 0.211 0.212
diabetes 0.449 0.364 0.336 0.307 0.289 0.293
asthma 0.232 0.268 0.283 0.278 0.241 0.193
stress 0.454 0.368 0.345 0.310 0.286 0.245
smoker -0.209 -0.182 -0.175 -0.157 -0.095 -0.036z
meals 0.189 0.160 0.130 0.107 0.092 0.089y
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.049 -0.048 -0.049 -0.048 -0.031 -0.012z
age -0.365z -0.319z -0.359z -0.139z 0.177z -0.061z
age2 0.094z 0.084z 0.096z 0.062z -0.021z 0.022z
age3 -0.006z -0.005z -0.006z -0.004z 0.001z -0.001z
age*female -0.078z 0.032z 0.226z 0.133z -0.108z 0.285z
(age*female)2 0.007z -0.022z -0.068z -0.066z 0.004z -0.070z
(age*female)3 -0.001z 0.001z 0.004z 0.005z 0.000z 0.004z
female 0.660z 0.548z 0.357z 0.683z 0.701z 0.011z
educmax 0.004z 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.006y 0.002z
lincome 0.068 0.057 0.058 0.054 0.046 0.020z
single -0.215 -0.189 -0.192 -0.202 -0.147 -0.100
student 0.039z 0.016z 0.014z 0.052z 0.064z 0.033z
retired 0.190 0.166 0.152 0.135 0.137 0.163
Geographic variables
Norte -0.078y -0.060z -0.068y -0.070y -0.082y -0.115
Lisboa -0.098y -0.078y -0.099 -0.107 -0.119 -0.130
Alentejo -0.308 -0.256 -0.261 -0.228 -0.195 -0.167
Algarve -0.245 -0.205 -0.200 -0.173 -0.161 -0.171
A￿ores -0.372 -0.348 -0.372 -0.376 -0.356 -0.357
Madeira -0.494 -0.482 -0.532 -0.554 -0.492 -0.468
Seasonality variables
winter 0.161 0.161 0.165 0.151 0.119 0.126
spring 0.099 0.098 0.101 0.089 0.065 0.064y
summer 0.076y 0.061y 0.044z 0.015z -0.017z 0.000z
Constant -2.076 -1.457 -1.206 -1.280 -1.039y -0.033z
Note: The subsample has 28,736 observations. Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not signi-
￿cative at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.













Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.220 0.209 0.193 0.177 0.114y 0.029z
privsub 0.176z 0.284y 0.345 0.384 0.300 0.255y
Health status variables
sick 0.254z 0.515y 0.686y 0.732 0.634 0.651y
limitdays 0.142 0.134 0.132 0.130 0.120 0.105
limited -0.044z 0.092z 0.117z 0.218z 0.347z 0.492
rheumatism 0.239 0.203y 0.229 0.263 0.267 0.276
osteoporosis 0.497z 0.524 0.501 0.469y 0.380 0.301z
cancer 0.556 0.438y 0.422 0.312y 0.276z 0.482z
kidneystones 0.136z 0.163z 0.270z 0.406 0.444 0.458
renalfailure 0.046z 0.071z 0.009z 0.309z 0.366z 0.420z
emphysema 0.040z 0.105z 0.218z 0.389y 0.400 0.344y
cerebralhemorrhage 0.170z 0.014z 0.371z 0.702z 0.722z 0.657y
infarction 0.971z 0.882z 0.814z 0.872z 0.857z 0.494z
depressivedisorder 0.370 0.421 0.425 0.438 0.393 0.365
otherchronicaldisease 0.507 0.552 0.613 0.631 0.521 0.437
highbloodpressure 0.435 0.535 0.560 0.524 0.425 0.294
chronicpain 0.218 0.270 0.341 0.376 0.368 0.360
diabetes 0.465 0.368 0.392 0.415 0.372 0.380
asthma 0.217y 0.250 0.257 0.311 0.273 0.278
stress 0.808 0.730 0.724 0.664 0.560 0.427
smoker -0.136 -0.140z -0.124 -0.105y -0.072z -0.012z
meals 0.178y 0.142 0.130z 0.135z 0.118z 0.057z
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.036y -0.041 -0.046 -0.053 -0.045 -0.024z
age -1.326z -1.285z -1.263z -2.047z -2.445z -1.387z
age2 0.372z 0.350z 0.343z 0.597z 0.765z 0.441z
age3 -0.033z -0.030z -0.030z -0.056z -0.077z -0.046z
age*female 1.639z 2.061z 1.851z 2.295z 2.049z 1.084z
(age*female)2 -0.552z -0.671z -0.605z -0.744z -0.690z -0.373z
(age*female)3 0.054z 0.065z 0.059z 0.072z 0.070z 0.039z
female -0.989z -1.471z -1.242z -1.610z -1.391z -0.648z
educmax 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.017 0.008z
lincome 0.120 0.116 0.113 0.100y 0.068 0.034z
single -0.185 -0.177 -0.194 -0.237 -0.234 -0.166
student -0.063z -0.068z -0.065z -0.040z 0.003z 0.018z
retired 0.216z 0.260z 0.287z 0.433z 0.345z 0.221z
Geographic variables
Norte 0.016z 0.020z -0.003z -0.022z -0.028z -0.055z
Lisboa 0.110z 0.117z 0.101z 0.081z 0.036z -0.004z
Alentejo -0.221 -0.243 -0.277 -0.317 -0.227 -0.188
Algarve -0.257 -0.260 -0.297 -0.308 -0.201 -0.174
A￿ores -0.263 -0.270 -0.313 -0.387 -0.379 -0.346
Madeira -0.573 -0.568 -0.625 -0.739 -0.771 -0.537
Seasonality variables
winter 0.256 0.252 0.250 0.250 0.199 0.172
spring 0.127y 0.136y 0.138y 0.132y 0.103z 0.075z
summer 0.063z 0.076z 0.076z 0.051z 0.022z 0.070z
Constant -1.775z -1.039z -0.801z 0.336z 1.392z 1.160z
Notes: The subsample has 12,637 observations. Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not
signi￿cant at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.













Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.002z 0.031z 0.034z 0.036z 0.048z 0.042z
privsub 0.193 0.213 0.184 0.152 0.091y 0.022z
Health status variables
sick 0.722 0.656 0.628 0.556 0.445 0.742
limitdays 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.048
limited 0.107z 0.211y 0.252 0.268 0.308 0.309
rheumatism 0.147 0.156 0.154 0.144 0.152 0.151
osteoporosis 0.317 0.249 0.216 0.192 0.149 0.110
cancer 0.475 0.456 0.413 0.364 0.380 0.447
kidneystones 0.165 0.170 0.192 0.194 0.201 0.178
renalfailure 0.201 0.250 0.259 0.240 0.246 0.234
emphysema 0.098z 0.156 0.181 0.186 0.189 0.220
cerebralhemorrhage 0.146y 0.171 0.142 0.136 0.181 0.196
infarction 0.314 0.372 0.362 0.334 0.286 0.189
depressivedisorder 0.142 0.176 0.193 0.188 0.179 0.152
otherchronicaldisease 0.322 0.316 0.307 0.282 0.264 0.246
highbloodpressure 0.404 0.352 0.324 0.271 0.230 0.173
chronicpain 0.164 0.171 0.179 0.181 0.173 0.170
diabetes 0.446 0.354 0.319 0.287 0.278 0.264
asthma 0.219 0.243 0.236 0.216 0.192 0.132
stress 0.387 0.307 0.279 0.254 0.230 0.194
smoker -0.291 -0.263 -0.271 -0.216 -0.130 -0.081y
meals 0.201 0.167 0.148 0.126 0.108 0.113
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize -0.035y -0.033 -0.030 -0.021z -0.005z 0.004z
age -0.857z -0.175z 0.755z 1.489z 0.550z -1.802z
age2 0.169z 0.050z -0.090z -0.213z -0.080z 0.307z
age3 -0.010z -0.003z 0.004z 0.011z 0.004z -0.017z
age*female 1.925z 1.759z 0.622z -0.536z 1.306z 4.042z
(age*female)2 -0.324z -0.308z -0.149z 0.035z -0.243z -0.682z
(age*female)3 0.017z 0.016z 0.009z 0.000z 0.014z 0.037z
female -3.286z -2.842z -0.182 2.154z -1.890z -7.495z
educmax -0.002z 0.003z 0.004z 0.003z 0.000z -0.001z
lincome 0.055y 0.041z 0.046y 0.043y 0.041y 0.017z
single -0.302 -0.232 -0.209 -0.152 -0.111y -0.072z
student 0.820 0.484z 0.580y 0.424z 0.154z 0.094z
retired 0.215 0.190 0.177 0.156 0.154 0.175z
Geographic variables
Norte -0.114y -0.106 -0.120 -0.116 -0.125 -0.156
Lisboa -0.145 -0.145 -0.174 -0.175 -0.195 -0.190
Alentejo -0.340 -0.272 -0.266 -0.221 -0.200 -0.169
Algarve -0.224 -0.175 -0.163 -0.139 -0.157 -0.162
A￿ores -0.391 -0.369 -0.378 -0.356 -0.348 -0.341
Madeira -0.418 -0.413 -0.451 -0.410 -0.402 -0.397
Seasonality variables
winter 0.127 0.131 0.128 0.111 0.108 0.103
spring 0.081y 0.088 0.086 0.076 0.065y 0.044z
summer 0.075z 0.054z 0.028z -0.009z -0.035z -0.043
Constant -0.798z -1.347z -3.134z -4.205z -1.706z 3.552z
Notes: The subsample has 16,637 observarions. Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not sig-
ni￿cant at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
xD Further results: the regressor "unemployed"
As already mentioned, when selecting the variables, we guaranteed that "treated" and
"untreated" groups have a common support by using only observations in the intersection
of the domains. Another problem that can emerge is the strong correlation between some
potential regressors and the double coverage dummies. One of the cases that deserves
special attention is the dummy "unemployed". Similar studies include this regressor (see
for example Winkelmann (2006)). Theoretically, it is reasonable to include it because it
captures the occupational status that in￿ uences the opportunity cost of visiting a doctor,
the income e⁄ect and the depreciation rate of health. Clearly, the individuals that do not
work present lower opportunity costs (both time and monetary related) when visiting a
doctor when compared to individuals that have a job. In accordance, we anticipate that
these covariates tend to increase the utilisation of doctor visits. Moreover, unemployed in-
dividuals may also present a higher rate of health depreciation because being unemployed
can induce a high level of stress. In our analysis its inclusion causes some problems. Table
D1 shows that there is a clear di⁄erent proportion of unemployed between subsystems,
which is related to the di⁄erent working conditions, specially in the case of public sec-
tor employees vis-￿-vis private employees. As such, it can happen that this variable (if
included in the speci￿cation) may capture some treatment e⁄ects.
Table D1: Unemployment status by subsystem
NHS Public subsystems Private subsystems
unemployed Freq % Freq. % Freq. %
= 0 27,423 95.3 5,552 99.5 932 97.9
= 1 1,355 4.7 26 0.5 20 2.1
The solution chosen for this issue was to exclude this variable from the conditional
quantile speci￿cation. To analyse the robustness of this option, we re-estimate the selected
speci￿cation excluding the unemployed individuals from the sample. As a whole, the
results are very similar and, in particular, the health insurance coe¢ cients lead to the
same conclusion, although with a level sightly higher (see Table D2).














Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0.087 0.092 0.100 0.101 0.075 0.056y
privsub 0.226 0.246 0.262 0.243 0.192 0.155
Health status variables
sick 0.693 0.619 0.601 0.607 0.547 0.775
limitdays 0.071 0.073 0.075 0.074 0.071 0.073
limited 0.144z 0.215 0.254 0.325 0.339 0.373
rheumatism 0.143 0.142 0.143 0.144 0.152 0.151
osteoporosis 0.259 0.186 0.167 0.143 0.108 0.086y
cancer 0.470 0.464 0.433 0.387 0.400 0.509
kidneystones 0.152 0.157 0.176 0.188 0.228 0.220
renalfailure 0.151z 0.211 0.208 0.229 0.267 0.233
emphysema 0.091z 0.205 0.220 0.224 0.226 0.229
cerebralhemorrhage 0.135z 0.128y 0.127y 0.162 0.197 0.184
infarction 0.290 0.323 0.339 0.336 0.292 0.222
depressivedisorder 0.177 0.223 0.238 0.244 0.238 0.245
otherchronicaldisease 0.437 0.452 0.473 0.463 0.383 0.351
highbloodpressure 0.412 0.385 0.368 0.321 0.256 0.203
chronicpain 0.178 0.208 0.231 0.236 0.224 0.222
diabetes 0.430 0.350 0.319 0.295 0.278 0.293
asthma 0.320 0.351 0.361 0.355 0.284 0.239
stress 0.433 0.357 0.339 0.301 0.289 0.246
smoker -0.202 -0.173 -0.165 -0.152 -0.091 -0.039z
meals 0.186 0.160 0.131 0.116y 0.079 0.066y
Socioeconomic characteristics variables
householdsize -0.064 -0.061 -0.059 -0.059 -0.039 -0.019
age -1.058 -1.008 -1.041 -1.069 -0.733 -0.574
age2 0.229 0.219 0.228 0.241 0.162 0.124
age3 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.010 -0.008
age*female 0.532 0.562 0.619 0.727 0.477 0.332
(age*female)2 -0.113 -0.125 -0.141 -0.176 -0.113 -0.076
(age*female)3 0.006y 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.004y
female -0.315 -0.312 -0.335 -0.349 -0.212 -0.093z
educmax 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.006y
lincome 0.070 0.058 0.062 0.062 0.052 0.030z
single -0.221 -0.202 -0.201 -0.217 -0.163 -0.119
student -0.251 -0.249 -0.271 -0.252 -0.173 -0.166
retired 0.174 0.156 0.138 0.118 0.120 0.144
Demographic variables
Norte -0.060z -0.044z -0.048z -0.047z -0.057z -0.104
Lisboa -0.099y -0.073y -0.083y -0.089 -0.093 -0.111
Alentejo -0.284 -0.233 -0.228 -0.201 -0.161 -0.154
Algarve -0.259 -0.214 -0.202 -0.177 -0.148 -0.167
A￿ores -0.372 -0.341 -0.358 -0.379 -0.336 -0.353
Madeira -0.526 -0.509 -0.552 -0.603 -0.511 -0.483
Seasonality variables
winter 0.174 0.181 0.188 0.183 0.144 0.146
spring 0.089 0.093 0.100 0.096 0.072 0.065
summer 0.044z 0.035z 0.025z 0.005z -0.017z -0.006z
Constant -1.009 -0.402 -0.184z 0.107z 0.274y 0.677
Notes: The subsample has 34,356 observations. Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not
signi￿cant at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
xiiE Further results: adequacy of the exogeneity as-
sumption on the subsystems dummies
The features of the Portuguese health subsystems are unique (in particular, the fact that
the membership is mandatory and based on professional category and contributions are
related to income and not to risk characteristics of the individuals). The literature usually
assumes that the dummies indicating if an individual bene￿ts from those protection plans
gather conditions to be interpreted as exogenous (e.g. Barros et al. 2008 and Louren￿o
2007). The basic idea underlying this assumption is that the health risk characteristics
of the individuals do not in￿ uence the probability of bene￿ting from a subsystem. It can
be argued, however, that more risk averse people are more likely to be public employees.
The main argument behind this position is that employment decisions can be based in all
the features of the job, including health bene￿ts.35 The objective of the following exercise
is to provide further evidence on this issue, focusing on the public subsystems.
Among the population that bene￿ts from employer provided health insurance through
public schemes, there are direct bene￿ciaries, i.e. workers, and indirect bene￿ciaries, such
as spouses and dependants. Our strategy was to study the impact of public subsystems
using a sub-sample of individuals that are potentially "immune" to the above mentioned
problem, i.e. a sample of indirect bene￿ciaries of subsystems.36 The PHS dataset does
not provide this information directly. It is, however, possible to use a proxy to disentangle
between direct and indirect bene￿ciaries. Since we want to exclude individuals that are
currently workers of the public sector, we use a question that indicates for the employed
individuals what is the sector of activity (according to the Portuguese classi￿cation of
economic activities) in which they are currently working. In particular, public employees
are mostly classi￿ed in the sectors L (public administration, defense and compulsory social
security), M (education) and N (health). Therefore, we created a subsample of bene￿cia-
ries of public subsystems that excludes observations of individuals that are employed in
35In fact, although in Portugal all residents have the right to health protection through NHS, it can
be argued that as these subsystems are more bene￿cial to their members, their complementary and
supplementary coverage can be taken into account when choosing their job.
36Note that only direct bene￿ciaries are more likely to have chosen their professional activities based
on their risk features. Cohabitation decisions are usualy driven by other factors. However, it can be
argued that the direct bene￿ciaries based their employment decisions not only on their own health but
also on the health of their households. We believe that this is not an important consideration, because
the government recruitment usualy takes place at the beginning of the employment spell.
xiiithese three sectors. This procedure is the best possible approximation to the sample of
spouses and descendants of public employees. Nevertheless, two minor drawbacks should
be borne in mind: we are also excluding individuals of the private sector (the ones that
work in the sectors M and N) and a reduced number of public employees may still remain
in the sample (the ones employed in the other sectors). Table E1 shows some di⁄erences
between this subsample and the one previously used.
Table E1: Di⁄erences between direct and indirect bene￿ciaries of public subsystems
Bene￿ciaries of public subsystems
direct and indirect indirect
Observations 5,578 2,347
(% in total observations) 15.8% 7.5%
y 1.01 0.90
￿y 1.64 1.54
Using the sample of individuals covered solely by the NHS and this sample of indirect
bene￿ciaries of public subsystems on top of NHS, we estimate the double coverage e⁄ects
using the following conditional quantiles speci￿cation
Qy￿
i (￿jx) = ￿ + exp[￿0(￿) + ￿1ind(￿)pubsub_indi + ￿(￿)zi]; 0 ￿ ￿ < 1
where pubsub_indi indicates if a person bene￿ts indirectly from double coverage through
a "public insurance health subsystem". The vector zi includes all the regressors previously
used. Table E2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients. As expected, the results regarding the
covariates for which we are controlling for are very similar to the ones obtained with
the full sample. In particular, health status variables as a whole have a positive e⁄ect
that increases with ￿ and socioeconomic characteristics seem to have a similar impact
across quantiles. Regarding the impact of double coverage, it is now even more clear that
public subsystem bene￿ciaries consume a high number of doctor visits when compared
with individuals covered solely by NHS, and this positive e⁄ect slightly decreases with ￿.
Note that the e⁄ect is more expressive than the one obtained for all public subsystems
bene￿ciaries. Since the estimated coe¢ cientes resulting from the subsample of indirect
bene￿ciaries were not lower than the ones resulting from the sample with both direct
and indirect bene￿ciaries, this sensitivity analysis exercise gives us further evidence on
supporting the hypothesis that there are no adverse selection e⁄ects in our main dataset.














Health insurance status variables
pubsub_ind 0.167 0.165 0.169 0.165 0.124 0.098
Health status variables
sick 0.676 0.639 0.621 0.618 0.555 0.802
limitdays 0.070 0.073 0.076 0.075 0.072 0.073
limited 0.150 0.212 0.246 0.320 0.331 0.371
rheumatism 0.134 0.138 0.138 0.131 0.133 0.142
osteoporosis 0.305 0.216 0.188 0.155 0.111 0.080y
cancer 0.486 0.484 0.442 0.403 0.441 0.560
kidneystones 0.153 0.154 0.182 0.202 0.231 0.229
renalfailure 0.165 0.210 0.207 0.202 0.243 0.229
emphysema 0.072 0.171 0.181 0.194 0.198 0.206
cerebralhemorrhage 0.109 0.114y 0.111z 0.139y 0.162 0.180
infarction 0.267 0.277 0.282 0.296 0.264 0.195
depressivedisorder 0.167 0.221 0.237 0.244 0.234 0.243
otherchronicaldisease 0.443 0.457 0.480 0.471 0.395 0.361
highbloodpressure 0.447 0.397 0.374 0.327 0.264 0.213
chronicpain 0.152 0.183 0.206 0.217 0.211 0.216
diabetes 0.460 0.376 0.349 0.334 0.312 0.305
asthma 0.284 0.345 0.367 0.371 0.302 0.247
stress 0.431 0.363 0.350 0.317 0.305 0.255
smoker -0.241 -0.202 -0.193 -0.175 -0.107 -0.039z
meals 0.162 0.126 0.102y 0.094y 0.074y 0.071z
Socioeconomic characteristics variables
householdsize -0.068 -0.062 -0.060 -0.059 -0.039 -0.014z
age -1.062 -1.019 -1.056 -1.095 -0.770 -0.586
age2 0.230 0.221 0.231 0.246 0.170 0.127
age3 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.008
age*female 0.535 0.568 0.629 0.761 0.532 0.363
(age*female)2 -0.114 -0.125 -0.142 -0.181 -0.125 -0.084
(age*female)3 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.005y
female -0.310 -0.322 -0.352 -0.381 -0.254 -0.127z
educmax 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.005z
lincome 0.074 0.062 0.068 0.069 0.058 0.032z
single -0.240 -0.219 -0.224 -0.244 -0.193 -0.140
student -0.278 -0.272 -0.295 -0.281 -0.201 -0.193
retired 0.174 0.156 0.143 0.124 0.120 0.142
Demographic variables
Norte -0.047 -0.037z -0.047z -0.054z -0.067y -0.111
Lisboa -0.066 -0.077y -0.095 -0.102 -0.111 -0.132
Alentejo -0.282 -0.236 -0.229 -0.199 -0.162 -0.152
Algarve -0.259 -0.233 -0.228 -0.199 -0.167 -0.184
A￿ores -0.355 -0.342 -0.372 -0.400 -0.356 -0.362
Madeira -0.540 -0.530 -0.579 -0.640 -0.551 -0.502
Seasonality variables
winter 0.155 0.166 0.175 0.169 0.129 0.138
spring 0.072 0.075 0.083 0.076 0.055y 0.054y
summer 0.045 0.026z 0.019z -0.005z -0.029z -0.011z
Constant 0.000 -0.353y -0.140z 0.154z 0.322y 0.706
Notes: The subsample has 31,125 observations. Coe¢ cients marked with z and yare not
signi￿cant at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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